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CONTRACT LAW AND FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS: AN APPLICATION OF HOHFELDIAN
TERMINOLOGY TO CONTRACT DOCTRINE
Daniel P. O'Gorman*
I. INTRODUCrION
In 1913 a manuscript arrived at the Yale Law Journal.1 It was titled
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
and its author was an obscure Stanford law professor named Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld.2 In it he argued that courts used the term right in four
different senses,3 and that a court's failure to recognize this could lead to
deductive reasoning errors when deciding cases.' The journal's editors
brought the piece to Arthur L. Corbin, the journal's faculty advisor, for his
thoughts.' He immediately advised them to publish it.6
The article's stated goal was modest-to aid law students "in the un-
derstanding and in the solution of practical, every-day problems of the
* Associate Professor, Barry University School of Law. The author thanks the editorial staff at
the Mississippi College Law Review for many helpful suggestions and Dean Leticia Diaz for providing,
on behalf of Barry Law School, a grant for the writing of this Article.
1. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, Foreword to WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING, at vii (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2004) (1917)
[hereinafter Foreword].
2. Id.; see also N.E.H. Hull, Vital Schools of Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound, Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, and the Promotion of an Academic Jurisprudential Agenda, 1910-1919, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC.
235, 249 (1995) (noting that Hohfeld "was not very well known among the stars of the profession");
WILLIAM TWINING: KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 34 (1973) (referring to Hohfeld
as "a hitherto unknown professor at Stanford").
3. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
4. Id. at 19.
5. Foreword, supra note 1, at vii.; see also N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND & KARL LLEWELLYN:
SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 103 (1997) (identifying Corbin as the journal's faculty
advisor at the time). It is possible that the law journal's editors solicited the piece. In the article,
Hohfeld referred to "the invitation of the editor of this journal." Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 20. Also, in
a letter to Roscoe Pound, Hohfeld wrote that he had "just about completed the article and was wonder-
ing whether to send it to Harvard or to Columbia Law Review when an invitation to contribute arrived
from the Yale Law Journal-a rather urgent invitation in fact, as they are doubtless 'hard up' for contri-
butions." Hull, supra note 2, at 256 (quoting Letter from Wesley N. Hohfeld to Roscoe Pound (Oct. 23,
1913) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)). Years later, Corbin wrote that he did not know
if the article was submitted in response to an invitation to contribute. Id. (quoting Letter from Arthur
L. Corbin to E.V. Rostow (Aug. 10, 1957) (on file with the Yale University Library)). Professor Hull
noted that Hohfeld wanted a job at Yale and submitted the article to the Yale Law Journal because
"[h]e clearly hoped to attract Yale's attention with the piece." Id. at 261.
6. Foreword, supra note 1, at vii; see also HULL, supra note 5, at 103 ("I was at once much
interested; and I advised publication.") (quoting Arthur L. Corbin to E. V. Rostow (Aug. 10, 1957) (on
file with the Yale University Library)).
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law."'7 It also had the air of nineteenth century formalism and conceptual-
ism,8 ideas soon to be out of fashion.9 But underneath its modest pedagog-
ical purpose and formalistic and conceptual aura, the piece had subversive
power.' Intentionally or not, this obscure professor's article was a devas-
tating critique on formalist legal reasoning-the very type of reasoning it
seemed to represent."
The article's publication in the Yale Law Journal led to the realization
of Hohfeld's immediate goals of teaching at Yale Law School12 and having
his system of legal terminology incorporated into the classroom. By 1916
the entire Yale faculty, save one, adopted Hohfeldian terminology for
classroom use, and the students, who had at first opposed it, were ulti-
mately converted. 3 By the 1920s its use even spread to the classrooms in
Austin and Langdell Halls at Harvard Law School, a school accustomed to
setting trends, not following them. 4 Despite Hohfeld's untimely death just
five years after the article's publication,'" Corbin ensured Hohfeld's ap-
proach to legal terminology would have a lasting impact, particularly in the
area of contract law, by incorporating his terminology in a series of law
journal articles and then in the Restatement of Contracts.6 The article's
subversive power was also used by the American legal realists in the 1920s
and 1930s, as they worked to overthrow legal formalism.
17
But if the success of an article is measured by its author's goals,
Hohfeld's article was merely a short-term success. By the Second World
War his work had fallen from view, 8 and though it has been argued this
7. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 20. As stated by one commentator, "Hohfeldian analysis . . . is
simply a useful tool in keeping ideas straight .... " Peter Linzer, Wesley Hohfeld, Arthur Corbin and
Precise Legal Terminology, in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 271 (Peter Linzer, ed., 2d ed. 1995).
8. Formalism is "analysis (either in articles or judicial opinions) that moves mechanically or
automatically from category or concept to conclusion, without consideration of policy, morality, or
practice." BRIAN H. Bix, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 69 (2004). Conceptualism is "[a] pejora-
tive term, used most commonly by the American legal realists and their followers, against opponents
accused of improperly deriving conclusions from the mere nature of abstract concepts (e.g. 'contract' or
'property') . . . . The charge of 'conceptualism' is often connected to, or interchangeable with, the
charge of 'formalism."' Id. at 38.
9. See David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, Introduction to THE CANON OF AMERICAN
LEGAL THOUGHT 1, 8-10 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III, eds., 2006) [hereinafter CANON]
(describing the fall of legal formalism in the early twentieth century).
10. See id. at 47 (noting that the article was a "manifesto for a new way of conceptualizing the
'legal relations' [the article] describe[s]").
11. Id. at 47-48.
12. See Hull, supra note 2, at 260 ("Arthur Corbin ... was so taken with the article that he
decided to see if he could bring the young man to Yale. 'Largely because of Hoh's article, but also
because of the results of inquiry, Yale offered a professorship to him, on a permanent basis.' ") (quoting
Arthur L. Corbin to E. V. Rostow (Aug. 10, 1957) (on file with the Yale University Library)).
13. Id. at 268.
14. Id. at 276.
15. See id. at 274-75 (detailing Hohfeld's illness); George W. Goble, Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb,
in 9 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 125 (1932) (same).
16. TWINING, supra note 2, at 35.
17. See CANON, supra note 9, at 50-51 (describing the American legal realists' use of Hohfeld's
ideas); see also id. at 53 ("It would be difficult to overstate the significance of Hohfeld's central analyti-
cal insights for the legal realists in general, all of whom borrowed from his framework.").
18. Id. at 53.
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was "in part because his analytic methods had been so thoroughly absorbed
by the legal professoriate,' 9 "in law schools today, Hohfeld is relatively
unknown and [probably] seldom mentioned in the classroom.
'20
Hohfeldian analysis is not primarily remembered for its use as an aid "in
understanding and in the solution of practical, every-day problems of the
law, '21 but for the instrumental role it played in overturning legal formal-
ism as the prevailing mode of legal thought.2
The legal academy's neglect of the article's stated purpose is unfortu-
nate, for today this is where it has the most to offer. As recently stated by
Professor David Kennedy:
Commentators have often pointed out that judges do not, in
fact, use Hohfeldian terms with anything like the precision
he proposed. Hohfeldian deductive errors continue to litter
the case reports. But Hohfeld's legacy was less the elimina-
tion of the reasoning errors that troubled him than the es-
tablishment of a mode of legal reasoning that can be used to
put analytic pressure on the reasoning of judges, lawyers,
and law students .... Hohfeld's article has become canoni-
cal not as a grammatical rule book for correct usage, but as
the origin for a style of critical analysis which has become
central to American legal thought.23
Further evidence of Professor Kennedy's critique is that judges do not
use Hohfeldian terms with the precision that Hohfeld proposed. Hohfeld's
ideas, though purportedly "thoroughly absorbed by the legal professori-
ate '24 and "central to our understanding of what it means to 'think like a
lawyer,'"25 have not, in fact, been thoroughly absorbed by law students,
lawyers, and judges. Hohfeldian critical analysis is a tool that few are
trained to use and that even fewer employ. And, thus, law students, law-
yers, and judges remain as susceptible to the deductive errors to which they
were susceptible when Hohfeld wrote his article over a century ago.26
In 2002, Professor Curtis Nyquist encouraged the legal academy to
rediscover Hohfeld's work, and detailed the benefits of teaching
19. Id.
20. Curtis Nyquist, Teaching Wesley Hohfeld's Theory of Legal Relations, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC.
238, 238 (2002); see also CANON, supra note 9, at 47 ("Hohfeld's name has largely faded from
memory.").
21. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 20.
22. In fact, Walter Wheeler Cook "made Hohfeld into the first realist," Hull, supra note 2, at 278,
and Hohfeld has been described as an American legal realist. See Carl Wellman, Hohfeld, Wesley
Newcomb, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 270, 270 (Roger K. Newman
ed., 2009); BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND
THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 47 (1998).
23. CANON, supra note 9, at 51.
24. Id. at 53.
25. Id. at 47.
26. See id. at 51 ("Hohfeldian deductive errors continue to litter the case reports.").
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Hohfeldian analysis to our future lawyers and judges.2 7 This Article con-
tinues Professor Nyquist's effort, maintaining that Hohfeld's ideas should
be given renewed attention for their stated purpose-as an aid to legal rea-
soning2S-and that Hohfeldian analysis should not simply serve as a foot-
note in the story of the fall of legal formalism. Hohfeld's role in
overturning legal formalism ran its course long ago.29 His system's current
practical use lies in its stated purpose-to avoid errors in deductive reason-
ing.30 By reemphasizing Hohfeldian analysis, law students, then lawyers,
and then ultimately judges, will be better trained to think like lawyers, and
to recognize and to avoid the errors in deductive reasoning that led
Hohfeld to develop his system.
In an effort to continue the move toward better deductive reasoning
skills started by Professor Nyquist, this Article analyzes the most impor-
tant contract-law doctrines through Hohfeldian terminology. This area of
law has been chosen not because its subject matter is necessarily better
suited for Hohfeldian analysis than any other,31 but because it is this au-
thor's area of expertise. Part II of this Article provides a background of
Wesley Hohfeld and his seminal article. Part III explains the value of
reemphasizing Hohfeldian terminology. Part IV applies his terminology to
the key aspects of contract law. Part V is a brief conclusion.
II. WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD AND SOME FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
This Part provides a background of both Wesley Hohfeld and his semi-
nal article, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning. As will be seen, Hohfeld's story is one of ups and downs-from
brilliant student to obscure professor; from obscure professor to
wunderkind; from wunderkind to obscurity.
A. The Brilliant Student
Hohfeld was born in 1879 in Oakland, California.32 He attended high
school in San Francisco and was a brilliant student,33 and then went on to
earn an undergraduate degree from the University of California, Berkeley,
in 1901. 3 ' At Berkeley he was awarded a gold medal for receiving the high-
est possible grade in each of his courses. 35 As early as his freshman year in
27. See Nyquist, supra note 20, at 246-53.
28. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 20.
29. See CANON, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that by the Second World War legal realism "had
been successful in eliminating 'classical legal thought' as the established common sense of the legal
establishment").
30. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 20.
31. But see TWINING, supra note 2, at 35 ("[T]here is some truth in saying that this type of analy-
sis has more value in its application to contract than to most other branches of law.").
32. Wellman, supra note 22, at 270.
33. Hull, supra note 2, at 246.
34. Wellman, supra note 22, at 270.
35. Id.
[VOL. 33:317
2015] CONTRACT LAW & FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 321
college he developed an interest in legal analysis, reading John Austin's
Jurisprudence and heavily annotating it.36 Hohfeld's interest in Austin pre-
saged his own work in analytical jurisprudence.37
In 1901 he went directly from college to Harvard Law School.38
Hohfeld performed well at Harvard, serving as an editor of the Harvard
Law Review and graduating cum laude in 1904. 39 While at Harvard, he
assisted John Chapman Gray,4° his favorite professor.41 Gray, much like
what Hohfeld would become, was an enigma, his doctrinal treatises expres-
sions of "classical orthodoxy" depicted the areas of law discussed in the
treatises "as founded on a few fundamental principles and conceptions that
were elaborated with relentless deductive logic into a myriad of binding
rules."'42 Yet Gray's jurisprudential writings
in many ways anticipated legal realism, the jurisprudence
that supplanted classical orthodoxy in the 1930s. Law is not
some brooding and transcendent omnipresence, according
to Gray, but is simply 'the opinion of judges on matters of
ethics and public policy.' In determining what the law is,
judges consider a variety of sources, such as statutes, prece-
dent, custom, expert opinion, morality, and public policy.
But ultimately, law consists of the rules that judges choose
to enforce.43
Hohfeld's writings would one day reflect the same apparent inconsistency
between classical orthodoxy and legal realism.
B. The Obscure Professor
After law school, Hohfeld practiced for a year at the San Francisco law
firm Morrison & Cope, at which time he was offered partnership.44
36. Id.; TWINING. supra note 2, at 35.
37. Austin "was arguably the first writer to approach the theory of law analytically (as contrasted
with approaches to law grounded in history or sociology, or arguments about law that were secondary
to more general moral and political theories)." Bix, supra note 8, at 11. Analytical jurisprudence was
(and is) "[a]n approach to the philosophy of law which emphasizes the analysis of concepts (e.g. 'law',
'right', 'property')" and in particular involves "a search for the meanings of terms and concepts." Id. at
6. Analytical claims "emphasize logic ... and explorations of the surface or hidden logic of terms and
concepts" and are "contrasted with claims that are primarily normative (what should be done) and
claims that are primarily empirical (how things happen to be .... )." Id.
38. Hull, supra note 2, at 246.
39. Id.
40. Wellman, supra note 22, at 270.
41. Hull, supra note 2, at 271-72.
42. Stephen A. Siegel, Gray, John Chipman, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW 230, 230-31 (Roger K. Newman, ed., 2009).
43. Id. at 231.
44. Wellman, supra note 22, at 270. Accounts of Hohfeld's background state that he joined the
firm of Morrison, Cope & Brobeck, but this appears to be incorrect. The firm was called Morrison &
Cope until 1906 when it then became Morrison, Cope & Brobeck. See Alexander Francis Morrison,
San Francisco Biographies, http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/-npmelton/sfbmorr5.htm
(last visited Aug. 3, 2014). By this time, however, Hohfeld had left the firm to teach at Stanford. See
Goble, supra note 15, at 124 (noting that Hohfeld joined the Stanford faculty in 1905).
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Hohfeld declined, however, and instead joined the faculty of Stanford Law
School as an instructor in 1905 and taught there until 1914,"5 rising to assis-
tant professor of law, then associate professor of law, and ultimately pro-
fessor of law.46 But at the time, Stanford Law School did not have its
present reputation, and Hohfeld did not make much of a name for himself
during his tenure.4"
In 1909 and 1910 he did, however, publish a four-part article in the
Columbia Law Review on stockholders' individual liability for corporate
debts,48 articles that included glimpses of his forthcoming article on legal
terminology.4 9 "[Plortions of it announced an abiding interest in the way in
which judges' and lawyers' language obscured essential jural relationships.
Hohfeld charged that '[t]he law is constantly suffering from a loose, undis-
criminating, and misleading terminology.' "'50 But the articles were
"densely argued"51 and they "seem to have made hardly a ripple in the
pond of legal scholarship . "..."52
C. The Seminal Article
In 1913, Hohfeld published three articles,53 the most important of
which was Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning published in November in the Yale Law Journal.54 The article
45. Wellman, supra note 22, at 270. According to George W. Goble, "[h]e preferred the quiet
and scholarly environment of the university with its opportunity for unbiased study to the usually hur-
ried and partisan intellectual pursuits of a busy law office." Goble, supra note 15, at 124.
46. Comment, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 28 YALE L.J. 166, 167 (1918). The authorship of this
Comment has been attributed to Hohfeld's former student and the Yale Law Journal's editor-in-chief,
Karl Llewellyn. See Wellman, supra note 22, at 270 (attributing a line from the Comment to Llewellyn).
The Comment states that Hohfeld first took a position as an instructor at Hastings College of Law in
San Francisco, see Comment, supra note 46, at 167, but if this is so, it does not appear in the other
accounts of Hohfeld's background. That the Comment was written much earlier than other accounts of
Hohfeld's background suggests greater reliability than subsequent accounts, but Llewellyn (assuming
he was the Comment's author) might simply have been mistaken. Goble was surely aware of the Com-
ment's reference to Hastings, but chose to ignore it in the biographical entry he wrote, see Goble, supra
note 15, at 124, which suggests he concluded it was a mistake. A search of documents from the relevant
time period by the law school's Special Collections Manager at Hastings College of Law did not dis-
close any documents referencing Hohfeld. See e-mail from Tony Pelcynski, Reference Librarian, Uni-
versity of California Hastings College of the Law, to Louis M. Rosen, Reference Librarian and
Assistant Professor of Law Library, Barry University Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law (August 4,
2014, 7:34 p.m.) (on file with author).
47. See Hull, supra note 2, at 248-49 (noting that Hohfeld "was not very well known among the
stars of the profession" and that during Hohfeld's tenure, Stanford Law School did not have its current
reputation).
48. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corporate Debts (pt.
1), 9 COLUM. L. REV. 285 (1909): Wesley N. Hohfeld. The Individual Liability of Stockholders and the
Conflict of Laws (pts. 2-4), 9 COLUM. L. REV. 492 (1909), 10 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 520 (1910).
49. Hull, supra note 2, at 246-47.
50. Id. at 247 (quoting Wesley N. Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Cor-
porate Debts (pt. 1), 9 COLUM. L. REV. 285, 290 n.14 (1909)).
51. Id. at 246.
52. Id. at 249.
53. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, The Need of Remedial Legislation in the California Law of Trusts and
Perpetuities, 1 CAL. L. REV. 305 (1913); Wesley N. Hohfeld, The Relations Between Equity and Law, 11
MICH. L. REV. 537 (1913): Hohfeld, supra note 3.
54. Hull, supra note 2, at 255.
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was a work of analytical jurisprudence, analyzing and seeking to clarify the
use of eight legal concepts-right, privilege, power, immunity, duty, no-
right, liability, and disability." Hohfeld, in a sense, was completing the
project of the eighteenth and nineteenth-century analytical jurists, includ-
ing John Austin, who had sought to "unify the common law by identifying
its basic analytic components.
56
Before Hohfeld discussed these eight legal concepts, he contrasted le-
gal conceptions with non-legal conceptions.57 Non-legal conceptions, he
asserted, include "the physical and mental facts that call [legal] relations
into being."58 For example, a man saying to a woman, "I want you to have
my pocket watch," then handing it to her, and her taking possession of it,
are all physical facts. If the man intended the pocket watch to be a gift,
that intention is a mental fact. The uttering of the words, the intention to
give a gift, the handing over of the watch, and the woman taking possession
of it, are thus all non-legal conceptions. (They are the types of conceptions
that should be included in a factual portion of a judge's legal opinion, a
lawyer's appellate brief, or a law-student's case brief, assuming the facts are
relevant to the legal issue involved in the controversy.)
Legal conceptions include the legal relations that arise upon the occur-
rence of physical and mental facts.59 Thus, when the owner of the pocket
watch handed it to the woman with the intent to transfer ownership, and
the woman took possession of it (all physical and mental facts, and thus
non-legal conceptions), the woman becomes the owner of the watch (i.e.,
the legal relationship between the man and the woman with respect to the
watch changes). 60 The resulting legal relationship that arose out of the
physical and mental facts is a legal conception.
Hohfeld argued that courts and lawyers often confuse legal concep-
tions and non-legal conceptions 61 because of "the ambiguity and looseness
of our legal terminology."62 For example, the word property is a legal con-
ception that is often used to refer to the physical item owned by a person,63
thus confusing a legal conception (property) with a non-legal conception (a
55. See Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 58 ("In the latter part of the preceding discussion, eight concep-
tions of the law have been analyzed and compared in some detail, the purpose having been to exhibit
not only their intrinsic meaning and scope, but also their relations to one another and the methods by
which they are applied, in judicial reasoning, to the solution of concrete problems of litigation.").
56. CANON, supra note 9, at 50; see also CANON, supra note 9, at 52 ("Hohfeld's effort to analyze
legal terminology in systematic terms built on the work of earlier analytic jurists, including Austin,
Salmond, and many others."); TwINING, supra note 2, at 35 ("Holifeld built on the work of English
analytic jurists such as Holland, Markby, Salmond and above all Austin, whom he first read while an
undergraduate at college.").
57. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 20-25.
58. Id. at 20.
59. Id.
60. See Kelly v. Huplits, 157 A. 704, 704 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931) ("The essential elements which
constitute a valid gift are the intention of the donor to make a gift, actual or constructive delivery, and
its acceptance by the donee.").
61. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 20.
62. Id. at 21.
63. Id.
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tangible thing). In the above hypothetical, it would therefore be improper
to say that the man gave the women his property. Rather, one should state
that the man gave the woman his pocket watch.
Hohfeld also emphasized a distinction between two types of non-legal
conceptions: operative facts and evidential facts.' Operative facts are
those that "under the general legal rules that are applicable, suffice to
change a legal relation."65 For example, with respect to the general legal
rule applicable to transferring ownership of a thing by giving it as a gift, the
operative facts would be, according to Hohfeld, "the intention of the donor
to make a gift, actual or constructive delivery [of the thing], and its accept-
ance by the donee."66 A fact might be an "operative fact" even though it
alone is insufficient to change a legal relation, if the fact is necessary, along
with other operative facts, to change a legal relation.67
"An evidential fact is one which, on being ascertained, affords some
logical basis-not conclusive-for inferring some other fact."68 For exam-
ple, if the woman has possession of the pocket watch, this is evidence of the
operative fact of the man's delivery of the watch to the woman. It is not an
operative fact because the woman might have taken the pocket watch from
the man without his permission.
Any fact that is neither an operative fact nor an evidential fact is not a
material fact,69 and is thus irrelevant to resolving the particular legal dis-
pute. For example, that the man with the pocket watch was wearing a blue
shirt when he gave the watch to the woman is neither an operative fact nor
an evidential fact and is thus irrelevant to the legal issue involved (whether
a change in legal relations between the man and the woman, with respect to
the watch, arose).70 Under the law of evidence such facts are inadmissi-
ble, 7 and even if admitted into evidence, should ordinarily be excluded
from the factual portion of a judge's opinion, a lawyer's appellate brief, or
a law-student's case brief.
Hohfeld then moved to his discussion of the different types of legal
relations that might arise from the existence of operative facts.7" He ar-
gued that all resulting legal relations-whether legal or equitable and irre-
spective of the area of law (torts, contracts, etc.)-involve jural interests
64. Id. at 25-28.
65. Id. at 25.
66. Kelly v. Huplits, 157 A. 704, 704 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931).
67. Corbin's definition of operative fact as "[a]ny fact the existence or occurrence of which will
cause new legal relations between persons," Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29
YALE L.J. 163, 164 (1919) [hereinafter Legal Analysis], would have been more precise had it taken this
into account.
68. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 27.
69. Legal Analysis, supra note 67, at 164.
70. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897)
("The reason why a lawyer does not mention that his client wore a white hat when he made a contract,
while Mrs. Quickly would be sure to dwell upon it along with the parcel gilt goblet and the sea-coal fire,
is that he forsees [sic] that the public force will act in the same way whatever his client had upon his
head.").
71. FED. R. EVID. 402.
72. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 28.
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that can be described with eight "fundamental legal conceptions," four of
which are legal advantages and four of which are legal disadvantages.73 He
referred to these eight as "the lowest common denominators of the law."7 4
Hohfeld acknowledged that these eight legal interests, being sui generis,
were difficult to define, and he set out to give them meaning by linking
each of the four advantages to correlative disadvantages and to their oppo-
sites.75 By identifying correlative interests, he set up a scheme in which all
legal interests are held by persons against other persons.76
Hohfeld's work was not entirely novel, and in particular he built on
Oliver Wendell Holmes's article Privilege, Malice, and Intent,77 where
"Holmes deconstructed abstract legal concepts like the right to compete, or
the privilege to abstain from contracting with others, into the complicated
functional relations that they embodied."7 Hohfeld, however, "formalized
Holmes's basic insight, offering a more systematic and precise vocabulary
to describe the range of functional relations created by legal rights."79
Hohfeld argued that judges often failed to reduce legal advantages to their
lowest common denominator, and instead used the term right to indiscrimi-
nately refer to what were in fact four different legal interests. These inter-
ests included-in addition to rights-what Hohfeld called privileges,
powers, and immunities.8" He argued that the term right should be given "a
definite and appropriate meaning"'" that was limited to a particular type of
legal interest, so as to avoid errors in legal reasoning.
The term right, he asserted, should refer only to a legal interest whose
opposite is no-right and whose correlative is duty.82 According to Hohfeld,
a right does not exist unless another person has a corresponding duty.8 3
Thus, "[a] right is one's affirmative claim against another"84 and a duty is
the corresponding legal obligation owed by the duty holder to the right
holder.85 In other words, a right exists when the government will sanction
the person having the corresponding duty for such person's failure to per-
form the duty.86 Without someone having a duty, there can be no right.
73. Id. at 30.
74. Id. at 58.
75. Id. at 30.
76. See CANON, supra note 9 at 48 ("Hohfeld proposes to use these legal terms only in relation-
ship to one another. For example, he proposes to use the term right to describe a person's legal interest
only where another person has a duty, and vice versa.").
77. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1894).
78. FRIED, supra note 22, at 51.
79. Id.
80. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 30.
81. Id. at 31.
82. Id. at 30-32.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 55.
85. Id. at 31.
86. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 1 (1936) ("A right, as the word is used in this
Restatement, is a legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that the other shall do a
given act or shall not do a given act."); Arthur L. Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501, 502
(1924) [hereinafter Rights] ("A 'right' exists when its possessor has the aid of some organized govern-
mental society in controlling the conduct of another person . . . . [I]ts 'command' and its punitive
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Under Hohfeld's definition of right, rights are held against other iden-
tifiable persons (including private and public entities).87 For example,
when a contract is formed, a promisee has a right to the promisor's prom-
ised performance, because the promisor owes a duty to the promisee to
perform as promised. We know that the legal relationship between the
promisor and the promisee is a "right-duty" relationship because the gov-
ernment provides a remedy to the promisee for the promisor's failure to
perform as promised.88 Under Hohfeld's description of right, it is apparent
that the term is limited to when there is a corresponding duty to perform or
not perform a physical act. For example, to illustrate a "right-duty" rela-
tionship, Hohfeld used a landowner's right to have third parties stay off the
owner's land (a physical act).89
Hohfeld argued that perhaps the best synonym for right, as he defined
it, is "claim." 90 Unlike Holmes, who linked a right to the prediction that a
court would in fact find a corresponding duty,91 "[f]or Hohfeld . . . rights
are analytically, not sociologically, correlative with duties; whether the du-
ties are ultimately enforced is altogether a different question." 92
A right can exist even if the corresponding duty is one that will not
mature until some point in the future, such as a legally enforceable promise
to repay a loan at a future date. 93 Such a right can be referred to as a future
right as opposed to a present right, and the corresponding duty as a future
duty as opposed to a present duty.94 But if all of the operative facts for the
creation of a right have occurred and all that is left for the duty to mature is
the passage of time, it is still considered an unconditional right with a corre-
sponding unconditional duty.95 If the corresponding duty is subject to some
sanctions create jural rights and duties .... In the present instance, we mean merely that because of
particular facts we can predict certain detrimental consequences to B if he does not conduct himself in a
specified way, these consequences being action (or more rarely, inaction) by a few individuals as agents
of society."); Id. at 518 ("[T]he existence of jural right and duty means.., that organized society affords
a systematic remedy or remedies through its judicial and its executive or administrative offices .... ).
A legal duty should therefore be distinguished from a moral duty whose breach results in informal
sanctions such being ostracized. Id. at 522.
87. See generally Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 30-32 (discussing rights and duties).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 346(1) (1981) ("The injured party has a right
to damages for any breach by a party against whom the contract is enforceable unless the claim for
damages has been suspended or discharged."). Even if the failure to perform as promised caused no
loss to the promisee, the promisee is entitled to an award as nominal damages in recognition that the
promisor has breached a duty owed to the promisee. Id. § 346(2).
89. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 32.
90. Id.
91. See Holmes, supra note 70, at 460-461 ("What constitutes law? You will find some text writ-
ers telling you that it is something different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts or
England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted axioms
or what not, which may or may not coincide with the decisions .... The prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.").
92. CANON, supra note 9, at 51. It was left to Corbin to combine Hohfeld and Holmes: "A
statement that a legal relation exists between A and B is a prediction as to what society, acting through
its courts or executive agents, will do or not do for one and against the other." Legal Analysis, supra
note 67, at 164.
93. Rights, supra note 86, at 511.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 512.
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event that is uncertain to occur, the right is considered a conditional right
and the corresponding duty a conditional duty.9 6
A privilege, according to Hohfeld, was the opposite of a duty and the
correlative of a no-right.97 "[A] privilege is one's freedom from the right or
claim of another." 98 Hohfeld believed that the closest synonyms for privi-
lege are "liberty" 99 or legal "freedom."'" If a person has a privilege against
another person then the privilege holder may perform (or not perform) the
act in question without the possibility of government sanction. Thus, the
other person does not have a right to have the person not perform the act
(the other person has what Hohfeld called a no-right). If a person holds a
privilege against another person and the person performs the privileged act,
he has violated no right of the other person. For example, if a person owns
a parcel of land, the person has the privilege to go onto the land, and the
other person does not have a right to have the owner stay off the land.
It appears Hohfeld intended a privilege to refer to the legal freedom to
perform a physical act. For example, when illustrating the concept of a
privilege, he referred to the privilege of entering or not entering onto land
that one owns 01 or eating a salad when the owner offers it to you, 102 both
physical acts. (It would be unusual to say that someone has the privilege to
engage in a mental act-though it is true-for the simple reason that it
would be a strange rule of law to provide that a person has a duty to not
engage in a particular mental act.10 3) But privilege should not be confused
with the mere physical ability to perform an act. One might have the physi-
cal ability to perform an act, but if performing such an act breaches a duty
owed to another person, one does not have the privilege, with respect to
that other person, to perform the act. Thus, a privilege is the ability to
engage in a physical act without violating a duty owed to another person.
The existence of a privilege does not, however, necessarily mean that a
third party with the corresponding no-right is under a duty to not interfere
with the privilege holder engaging in the privileged act. Whether the third
party has such a legal disadvantage (in addition to having a no-right) is
based on a separate analysis of whether the third party has a duty to refrain
from interference and the privilege holder a corresponding right from such
interference. And, according to Hohfeld, "[w]hether there should be such
concomitant rights (or claims) is ultimately a question of justice and policy;
and it should be considered, as such, on its merits."' ' Failure to recognize
that a privilege does not necessarily imply a corresponding duty of non-
96. Id. at 512-13.
97. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 30.
98. Id. at 55.
99. Id. at 41.
100. Id. at 55.
101. Id. at 32.
102. Id. at 35.
103. Some might, however, argue that a mental act can be a sin. See, e.g., Matthew 5:28 ("But I
tell you that anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his
heart."). However, the government does not sanction one for thinking bad thoughts.
104. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 55.
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interference by the party holding the corresponding no-right can lead to the
erroneous assumption that merely because a party holds a privilege against
another party, the other party necessarily has a duty to refrain from inter-
fering with the privilege holder exercising the privilege. (Of course, such
interference cannot breach a duty owed under criminal laws.)
Hohfeld's recognition of a privilege (with its correlative no-right) as a
legal interest distinct from a right (with its correlative duty) was his most
important insight: "In his view, it is one thing for the law to grant a privi-
lege, and something altogether different to corroborate that privilege with
a right. Doing so requires the creation of a new duty. Using Hohfeld's
terminology, it is simply wrong to deduce duties of non-interference from
Hohfeldian privileges."'' 05 Thus, a person might have a privilege to engage
in an act, but a third party might similarly have a privilege to interfere with
the person's attempt to complete the act. "With this idea, Hohfeld formal-
ized an emerging focus on the range of situations in which injury is legally
permitted without compensation.' ' 06 As Hohfeld wrote, "A rule of law
that permits is just as real as a rule of law that forbids,"'0 7 thereby "opening
the door to conceptualizing inaction [in the sense of failing to impose a
duty of non-interference] as a legislative and policy choice."'1 8
According to Hohfeld, "a legal power is the opposite of a legal disabil-
ity and the correlative of legal liability."' 9 A person holds a power when
the person has the ability, by performing some act under the person's voli-
tional control, "to effect [a] particular change of legal relations" with an-
other person." 0 A power is thus "one's affirmative 'control' over a given
legal relation as against another.""' Hohfeld believed the closest synonym
to legal power is legal "ability.""12 Thus, the opposite is disability, because
disability indicates a lack of ability."13 An example of a legal power is an
agent's ability to affect the principal's legal relations regarding matters
within the agent's authority (the scope of the authority being determined
by operative facts)." 4 The principal is under a corresponding liability in
that the agent's actions are binding on the principal." 5 Another example is
a donor's ability, under the doctrine gift causa mortis, to regain the legal
advantages of ownership of the tangible item given to the donee." 6 As will
be illustrated later in the application of Hohfeldian terminology to contract
105. CANON, supra note 9, at 49.
106. Id.
107. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 42 n.59.
108. CANON, supra note 9, at 49.
109. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 44.
110. Id. at 44-45.
111. Id. at 55.
112. Id. at 45.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 46.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 47.
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law, merely because one has a power does not necessarily mean one has a
privilege to engage in the acts necessary to exercise that power.
117
According to Hohfeld, an immunity is the opposite of a liability and
the correlative of legal disability."8 "[A]n immunity is one's freedom from
the legal power or 'control' of another as regards some legal relation." '119
Thus, a landowner has an immunity with respect to a third party transfer-
ring the landowner's ownership of the land, and the third party is under a
legal disability in that the third party does not have the power to compel
the landowner to divest her ownership of the land. 120 Hohfeld believed
that the closest synonym to immunity is "exemption. "121
Hohfeld concluded his article by arguing that by recognizing that all
legal relations can be reduced to these eight fundamental legal conceptions,
his so-called lowest common denominators of the law:
it becomes possible not only to discover essential similarities
and illuminating analogies in the midst of what appears su-
perficially to be infinite and hopeless variety, but also to dis-
cern common principles of justice and policy underlying the
various jural problems involved. An indirect, yet very prac-
tical, consequence is that it frequently becomes feasible, by
virtue of such analysis, to use as persuasive authorities judi-
cial precedents that might otherwise seem altogether irrele-
vant . . . . In short, the deeper the analysis, the greater
becomes one's perception of fundamental unity and har-
mony in the law.1
22
Thus, beyond Hohfeld's immediate goal of assisting law students with legal
reasoning, he hoped to promote unity and harmony in the law by eliminat-
ing logical errors and by discerning common principles of justice and policy
involved in apparently dissimilar issues.
Hohfeld's article did not, however, provide a theory for resolving such
issues of justice and policy. As stated by one commentator, "Hohfeldian
analysis of rights is intended to supply us with a precise vocabulary for
reporting the effect, in specific circumstances, of legal rules and transac-
tions, it is not intended to assist us in reaching conclusions about what, in
cases of uncertainty, the legal rules are or should be."'
1 23
117. See infra Part IV.
118. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 55.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 57.
122. Id. at 59.
123. NIGEL E. SIMMONDS, CENTRAL ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE: JUSTICE, LAW AND RIGHTS 298
(3d ed. 2008).
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Hohfeld's piece was a continuation of the work started by the eight-
eenth and nineteenth-century analytical jurists Jeremy Bentham, John Stu-
art Mill, and John Austin, who sought to define legal rights and liberties."2 4
Hohfeld's work also had a superficial similarity to legal formalism and con-
ceptualism by arguing that all legal relations could be reduced to a limited
number of legal concepts, by referring to "discern[ing] common principles
of justice and policy,"' 25 and by stating that his method of analysis could
lead to the "correct" and "true" solution to legal problems.'2 6 As Corbin
later wrote:
[I]t was Hoh's belief that there is a "positive law," to be
determined by logical analysis. He certainly handled his
materials with positiveness and vigor and reached definite
results. At the age of 36, he might not have approved of my
notion that all legal rules are merely tentative working rules,
drawn out of and changing with the customs and mores of
men.
1 27
Some considered Hohfeld's work "a perpetuation of the old conceptualist
nonsense."
' 128
But "Hohfeld was not a formalist of another color. ' 129 Whereas legal
formalists believed, like Hohfeld, that there were a limited number of fun-
damental legal principles, the formalists' fundamental principles were sub-
stantive value choices, "most significantly, the principle of individual
autonomy (and its substantive corollary, a will theory of legal obligation)
and the 'police power' of the state (the authority of the government to
regulate interactions among private parties to preserve 'the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare')."' 3 ° Unlike the formalists, Hohfeld
sought to "unify the law analytically rather than substantively." '' Even
the analytical jurists, whose work he built on, had sought to unify the law
substantively and declared that "[pleople were free to do anything that did
not hurt others."'13 2 Thus, although Hohfeld shared with the formalists and
the analytical jurists a desire to bring a "fundamental unity and harmony in
the law," he did not share their belief that such unity and harmony was
based on a broad definition of the concept of liberty, a definition that led to
124. See generally Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence
from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975.
125. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 59.
126. Id. at 19, 28.
127. Hull, supra note 2, at 259 (quoting Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to E. V. Rostow (Aug. 10,
1957) (on file with the Yale University Library); see also SIMMONDS, supra note 123, at 290 ("Hohfeld's
account of rights treats them as conclusively settling those issues to which they are indeed relevant:
their significance is limited and highly specific, but utterly reliable.").
128. Singer, supra note 124, at 978.
129. Hull, supra note 2, at 257; see also TWINING, supra note 2, at 36 ("Hohfeld ... was by no
means a blinkered formalist.").
130. CANON, supra note 9, at 47-48.
131. Id.
132. Singer, supra note 124, at 984.
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judicial results promoting a laissez-faire system. In fact, Hohfeld's article
failed to promote any particular substantive value choices.
Hohfeld's break from classical legal thought is reflected in the very
first paragraph of his article, in which he attacked the faulty reasoning of
the most significant legal thinkers of his time, 33 leading Corbin to write
years later that Hohfeld "constructed his analysis out of judicial reasoning
in the cases and he used it intensively in criticising [sic] judicial opinions and
legal articles (including those of his Harvard instructors). I feel sure that
those Harvard men, like Queen Vic., were 'not amused." 134
Rather than following in formalism's footsteps, his article was "a prag-
matic exercise in an era when pragmatism was still highly regarded.
1 13 5
Professor Hull explains:
Hohfeld's analytical schema of jural relations was prag-
matic. He wanted to connect legal symbols to the human
relationships they described. He did not believe in abstrac-
tions called 'rights' and 'duties.' He insisted that they be
defined in relation to human beings. By arraying these
terms with their 'jural opposites' and 'jural correlatives,' he
made clear that no person held a right without that right
having a legal impact upon someone else, and that there
were two different types of legal impact that flowed from
such rights. He also argued that legal relations were far too
varied and complex to be explained by using only the two
terms, right and duty . ... He looked at the practical effect
of legal relationships to distinguish many types of relation-
ships and tried to apply more descriptive terms to label
them. 136
Thus, "[t]o the extent that Hohfeld stressed underlying relationships and
practical context for his analysis of jural relations, his article is realistic as
well as pragmatic ... 137
Hohfeld's article undermined formalism in a variety of ways. First, by
pointing out that all legal interests consist of relations between persons, it
helt~ed to discredit classic legal thought's distinction between public and
private spheres. 38 "Hohfeld's analysis underscored a point. . . anticipated
by both the socialists and the Benthamites, that it was the state itself,
through its complex scheme of property and contract rules, that created the
horizontal relationships among individuals in those rules."' 39 Private
133. CANON, supra note 9, at 47.
134. Hull, supra note 2, at 258 (quoting Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to E. V. Rostow (Aug. 10,
1957) (on file with the Yale University Library)).
135. Hull, supra note 2, at 257.
136. Id. at 257-58.
137. Id. at 258.
138. WILLIAM W. FISHER III, et al., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 8 (1993).
139. FRIED, supra note 22, at 53.
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"rights ultimately derived from public power, in the form of
a promise by the state to refrain from interfering with the
[right holder as] she exercises [the] right.., and to force the
correlative Hohfeldian duty-holders ... to desist from any
interference with those rights .. ."140
Second, "[i]t markedly enhanced the power and precision of [the] cri-
tique of the classical style of legal reasoning."' 41 To the extent classical
legal theory maintained that its legal conclusions were based simply on de-
ductive reasoning, Hohfeld's analysis showed that such reasoning was often
faulty. Because there were different kinds of "rights," legal conclusions
could not be developed through deductions from a major premise such as
"the right to property." '142 The American legal realists would, therefore, be
able to extend "Hohfeld's analysis to criticize judicial expansion of a gen-
eral 'right to property' and 'right to freedom of contract' in ways which
overruled protective social legislation or restricted labor organizing.'
1 43
For example, the legal realists pointed out that it was a logical error to
conclude what constraints third parties are under from the use of the term
right, when such term was used indiscriminately.1 44 Hohfeld's article has,
therefore, been viewed as shifting the debate about rights into a new stage,
moving it away from the Kantian notion that rights, defined broadly, neces-
sarily have internal complexity (including corresponding duties) as well as
preemptive force. 145
Third, by emphasizing that all legal advantages have corresponding
disadvantages for others (through their correlatives), it helped legal realists
"explain why, in resolving most of the disputes that come before them (not
merely a few anomalous 'hard cases'), judges should weigh carefully the
practical implications of the decisions." '46 For example, when making deci-
sions about what a "right to property" means, a judge must decide which
legal disadvantages to impose on third parties. 147 The law's existing
scheme of advantages necessarily means there are corresponding disadvan-
tages placed on others, and any rearrangement of advantages "merely sub-
stitute[s] one form of constraint for another."' 48 Thus, "any advantage
given to one side [is] at the expense of the other .. . . "149 This means any
decision regarding a legal advantage is itself a distributive question-"ex-
tending privileges, rights, or any of his other [two] legal [advantages] will
create losers as well as winners."' 50 And "[t]he choice cannot be made by
140. Id. at 79.
141. FISHER, supra note 138, at 8.
142. CANON, supra note 9, at 49.
143. Id. at 50.
144. Id.
145. SIMMONDS, supra note 123, at 289-90.
146. FISHER, supra note 138, at 8.
147. CANON, supra note 9, at 49.
148. FRIED, supra note 22, at 53.
149. Id. at 109.
150. CANON, supra note 9, at 50.
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reference to the logic of [rights] itself, it will need to be made on other
grounds. Those other grounds might well be matters of social principle,
ethics, or policy . . . Hohfeld's analysis focused on the necessity of
choice." '151
Hohfeld's regime of legal advantages could, thus, not be reconciled
with liberties, because such entitlements necessarily imposed correlative re-
straints. 52 Although this was not a novel concept, Hohfeld gave the legal
realists "a vocabulary to show that it was necessarily true as a formal mat-
ter . . ."153 Hohfeld's logical positivist method "implicitly reoriented legal
thought away from abstract, free-floating notions of entitlement and to-
ward the sort of pragmatic, consequentialist view of law that was naturally
more congenial to the Realists' philosophical and political ends." '154 Simi-
larly, by deconstructing large concepts like "property" into their "compo-
nent functional relations, his method implicitly underscored how intricate
and changeable those relations were, thus undermining the 'givenness' of
whatever set of relations happened to exist at the time.
155
By reducing all legal relations to eight fundamental legal concepts,
while at the same time exposing the inevitable policy choices that must be
made by a court, Hohfeld completed the analytical jurists' project by "clos-
ing the door on efforts to render the legal system coherent and self-con-
tained through more precise analysis," and at the same time moved
American legal thought beyond that project.
1 56
As previously noted, it was Arthur Corbin who would ensure that
Hohfeld's approach to legal terminology would have a lasting impact, par-
ticularly in the area of contract law, by incorporating his terminology in a
series of law journal articles and then in the Restatement of Contracts.57
Corbin was likely attracted to Hohfeld's article because it did, in fact, com-
plete the project of eighteenth and nineteenth-century analytical jurists
while at the same time having elements that would enable legal thought to
progress. Hohfeld's effort to clarify the meaning of eight legal concepts
appealed to Corbin because Corbin recognized that "[t]here is peril ... in
th[e] common multiple usage of important words; it very frequently, espe-
cially when it occurs in a contract, a court opinion, or a statute, causes
misunderstanding, litigation, conflict, and inconsistent decisions. ' 158 Even
though Corbin did not believe that words had intrinsic meanings and be-
lieved they could only be given meaning in the context in which they were
151. Id. at 49-50.
152. FRIED, supra note 22, at 54.
153. Id. at 53.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. CANON, supra note 9, at 50; FRIED, supra note 22, at 211 (supporting the American legal
realists' "immediate agenda of putting such contestable political choices into the hands of the
legislature").
157. TWINING, supra note 2, at 35.
158. Foreword, supra note 1, at 8.
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used,' 59 he recognized the importance of using them carefully to avoid mis-
understandings, a problem with which he was surely well acquainted as a
Contracts professor. Also, Corbin, though suspicious of conceptualism,
160
was dedicated to explaining how contract law operated, and a system that
would help clarify its workings surely appealed to him. As noted by Wil-
liam Twining, "[iun respect of analysis and refinement of legal concepts, far
from reacting against the Austinian tradition, Corbin, following Hohfeld,
worked vigorously within it."''
Corbin was also a pragmatist 162 who rejected the prevailing method of
legal reasoning. Starting in 1912, he wrote a series of law journal articles
implicitly attacking formalism.' 63 Corbin believed court decisions were ul-
timately based on policy choices, and that common-law rules were devel-
oped inductively by examining the facts and holdings of all relevant cases,
with changes to the rules made when prior facts did not fit the current
case.' 64 Hohfeld, pointing out that judicial reasoning often included logical
errors, supported Corbin's belief that judicial reasoning was not simply an
exercise in deductive reasoning. At the same time, however, Corbin be-
lieved in the critical importance of rules, one scholar describing his view as
follows: "[r]ules are indeed only working rules, but working rules are not
irrelevant: if gone tomorrow, they are nonetheless here today, and they
have serious work to do."' 6 5 Although he was skeptical of textbook formu-
lations of rules and believed all legal doctrines are "tentative working
rules," Corbin was not skeptical about the existence of legal rules.'
66
Corbin was also immensely dedicated to improving how law schools
taught their students. He believed that the legal education he received at
Yale at the close of the late nineteenth century had not adequately pre-
pared him for practice. 167 His professors had employed the so-called Yale
system or Yale method, which consisted of lectures about canned doctrine,
the intensive study of textbooks, and examination by recitation in which
159. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL
L.Q. 161, 187 (1965).
160. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 49 (1992).
161. TWINING, supra note 2, at 29.
162. See HORWITZ, supra note 160, at 49 ("Corbin ... like many transplanted Westerners of this
period, brought an earthy, pragmatic skepticism to his intellectual work .... Corbin's writing in con-
tract is perhaps the ultimate legal expression of the pragmatic temperament at work, though if he had
even heard of William James or John Dewey, I doubt that Corbin would have cared much for their
high-toned philosophizing."); TWINING, supra note 2, at 27 (writing that Corbin was "brought up on the
prairies of Kansas" and that "[r]eligious skepticism, the pioneer spirit and a grandfather who 'laughed
at orthodoxies' set the tone for his early upbringing").
163. HORWITZ, supra note 160, at 49.
164. TWINING, supra note 2, at 31.
165. Kenneth D. Crews, Corbin, Edward Samuel, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW 129 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009).
166. TWINING, supra note 2, at 31.
167. Id. at 28.
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there were right and wrong answers to the professor's questions. 168 Corbin
believed the Yale system was deficient because it did not include any train-
ing in the analysis of complex fact patterns. 69 Thus, when Corbin started
teaching at Yale Law School, "his central concern was to work out a
method of teaching and exposition of legal doctrine which overcame the
inadequacies of the Yale system."' 7 ° Even before he knew the details of
Langdell's case method at Harvard, he developed his own case-method sys-
tem of teaching, and he was instrumental in establishing the case method at
Yale.
1 71
So when Hohfeld's manuscript landed on Corbin's desk in 1913,
Hohfeld's approach to legal reasoning and his pedagogical emphasis reso-
nated with Corbin. The article at once undermined formalism's emphasis
on guiding substantive legal principles from which subsidiary legal rules
could be deduced (and from there "correct" answers to disputes), while at
the same time clarifying the use of language to avoid logical errors in de-
ductive reasoning and helping to bring order to today's legal rules. Also,
Corbin needed someone with Hohfeld's brilliance to accomplish his goals.
As stated by Morton Horwitz, "Corbin was not an original thinker. He
took the ideas and insights of others and worked them into concrete legal
rules with care and precision." '172
D. The Wunderkind
Corbin was so taken with Hohfeld's article that he not only recom-
mended that the Yale Law Journal editors publish it, he pushed for
Hohfeld's hiring,173 and Hohfeld accepted a position at the school in
1914.174 Hohfeld would now have an opportunity at an eastern law school
to implement his article's intended purpose-the training of law students to
properly analyze legal problems and to recognize and avoid errors in de-
ductive reasoning.
But initially, Hohfeld likely overused his approach to legal reasoning.
In his first year at Yale he employed his terminology in the classroom in
such an exacting fashion that the students resented him.175 As stated by
Corbin, "[he] was a severe taskmaster, requiring his students to master his
168. Id.; John H. Langbein, Blackstone, Litchfield, and Yale: The Founding of Yale Law School, in
THE HISTORY OF YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIAL LECTURES 17, 30 (Anthony T. Kronman
ed., 2004); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 120 (1986).
169. TWINING, supra note 2, at 28.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 33.
172. HORWITZ, supra note 160, at 50.
173. TWINING, supra note 2, at 34.
174. Wellman, supra note 22, at 270. See also Hull, supra note 2, at 260 (quoting Letter from
Arthur L. Corbin to E. V. Rostow (Aug. 10, 1957) (on file with the Yale University Library) ("[Alt the
time that he endorsed 'Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions' for publication he was so taken with the
article that he decided to see if he could bring the young man to Yale. 'Largely because of Hoh's article,
but also because of the results of the inquiry, Yale offered a professorship to him, on a permanent
basis.' ")).
175. Hull, supra note 2, at 263-64.
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classification of 'fundamental conceptions' and to use accurately the set of
terms which they expressed. They found this, in the light of the usage of
the other professors, almost impossible." '176 The students were so vexed
they submitted a petition to the university's president requesting that
Hohfeld not be retained, 17 7 but his contract with Yale did not permit his
termination and the effort failed.178 Hohfeld was deeply hurt by the epi-
sode, but rather than returning to Stanford (as both his contracts with Stan-
ford and Yale permitted), he immediately resigned from Stanford and
chose to stay at Yale.179 Corbin later saw the law school's dean pat
Hohfeld on the back and say to him, "Be kinder to them, Hohfeld."' 8
Ultimately, Hohfeld triumphed. The entire Yale faculty, save one,' 8 '
eventually adopted Hohfeldian terminology for classroom use, and he be-
came the wunderkind of the faculty.182 Hohfeld had achieved exactly what
he set out to do. But in October 1918, just four years after starting at Yale,
he tragically died at the age of thirty-nine 183 from endocarditis 184 during
one of the worst influenza pandemics in modern history.
18 5
E. Fading from Memory
Corbin, before and after Hohfeld's death, sought to keep Hohfeld's
work alive, applying Hohfeldian terminology to various areas of contract
law in a series of law journal articles.186 Also, as the Special Adviser to the
Restatement of Contracts187 drafted between 1923 and 1932,188 Corbin per-
suaded Samuel Williston, the project's Reporter, to adopt Hohfeldian ter-
minology in the Restatement.189 And because of its implicit subversion of
formalism, the American legal realists seized upon Hohfeld's work and
176. Foreword, supra note 1, at x: see also Nyquist, supra note 20, at 245 ("In the classroom
Hohfeld apparently deployed his analysis of legal relations and vocabulary without letup. This, of
course, drove his student's to the dean's office.").
177. Hull, supra note 2, at 264-65.
178. Id. at 265.
179. Id. at 266.
180. Id. at 265 (quoting Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to E. V. Rostow (Aug. 10, 1957) (on file
with the Yale University Library)).
181. Id. at 268-69. Professor William Howard Taft was the lone exception. Id. at 268.
182. FISHER. supra note 138, at 8. In 1917 Hohfeld published a follow-up to his seminal article, in
which he applied his terminology to a variety of situations. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
183. Goble, supra note 15, at 125. There are references to Hohfeld being thirty-eight at the time
of his death, see, e.g., TWINING, supra note 2, at 34; Nyquist, supra note 20, at 238, but he was born on
August 8, 1879, and died on October 21, 1918, Goble, supra note 15, at 124, which would have made
him thirty-nine.
184. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 411 (11th ed. 2003) (defining endocar-
ditis as an "inflammation of the lining of the heart and its valves").
185. Hull, supra note 2, at 274.
186. TWINING, supra note 2, at 35.
187. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS vi (1932) (identifying Corbin as the Special Adviser).
188. See Wm. Draper Lewis, Introduction to RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS vii, ix (1932) (noting
that work was begun on the Restatement of Contracts in June 1923); id. at xi (noting that the Restate-
ment of Contracts was approved by the American Law Institute at its annual meeting in May 1932).
189. TwINING, supra note 2, at 35; see also Lewis, supra note 188, at xii-xiv (explaining the princi-
ples of terminology employed).
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used it to their advantage in overturning the prevailing method of legal
reasoning. 190
But by the Second World War, Hohfeld's work had largely faded from
memory. 91 Grant Gilmore, a student of Corbin's at Yale Law School in
the early 1940s, commented that even Corbin, while giving a preliminary
lecture on Hohfeldian analysis in his first-year Contracts course, did not
mention Hohfeld further. 192 In 1963, Corbin lamented as follows:
"Hohfeld may have hoped that his analysis of legal relations and his choice
of terms would be generally accepted and followed in the course of time.
Forty years of subsequent experience have shown that such a hope was in
large part ... vain."193
There are likely several reasons Hohfeld has largely faded from mem-
ory. First, the topic of legal terminology is unlikely to elicit widespread
enthusiasm. Even Corbin referred to the topic as a "dry region of legal
terminology-legal lingo" when discussing Hohfeld's work.194 For most,
discussing legal terminology is far less interesting than discussing the sub-
stantive policies that should be used to formulate legal rules and decide
cases. And although some readers initially "got the erroneous impression
that his analysis of concepts and terms was offered as a method of deter-
mining social and legal policy," '195 his analysis did nothing of the kind.
Hohfeld's goal was to promote proper and clear legal reasoning, not to
provide solutions to legal issues.1 96 Second, "most people resent being
shown that their thoughts are confused and their language is unclear and
inconsistent."' 97 Third, most find Hohfeld's writing style to be as dull and
obscure as the article's topic. Commentators have described his writing as
190. See FRIED, supra note 22, at 53 ("[Mlany of the Realists were quick to see its seditious impli-
cations."); FISHER, supra note 138. at 8 ("Neither essay makes any mention of sociology, economics, or
the law in action. Instead they seek to derive insight from precise categorization of legal concepts. Yet,
in several ways... Hohfeld's taxonomy of entitlements was of practical use to the Realists."); CANON,
supra note 9, at 53 ("It would be difficult to overstate the significance of Hohfeld's central analytic
insights for the legal realists in general, all of whom borrowed from his framework."). American legal
realism is "[t]he label for a category of legal commentators, primarily from the 1930s and 1940s, but
with some significant contributions earlier and later. These commentators were 'realists' in the sense
that they wanted citizens, lawyers, and judges to understand what was really going on behind the jargon
and mystification of the law." Bix, supra note 8, at 3.
191. CANON, supra note 9, at 53.
192. KALMAN, supra note 168, at 120.
193. Foreword, supra note 1, at ix. Hohfeld's analysis regained some of its popularity after 1970,
when Critical Legal Studies scholars sought to revive the realist tradition. CANON, supra note 9, at 53.
194. Arthur L. Corbin, Terminology and Classification in Fundamental Jural Relations, 4 AM. L.
SCH. REV. 607, 607 (1921).
195. Foreword, supra note 1, at xi.
196. See CANON, supra note 9, at 51 ("Hohfeld's analytic scheme offers no assistance here-this is
a question for policy. All sorts of moral, political, economic, or institutional considerations might well
push a decision maker to decide it one way or the other. But Hohfeld left it to others to speak about
how such questions of 'justice or policy' should be analyzed and decided.").
197. Foreword, supra note 1, at ix.
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"difficult to read," '198 having "the air of musty scholasticism," '99 and "tur-
gid and abstract."2 ° Fourth, using Hohfeld's legal terminology can be tax-
ing; Corbin noted that "mastery of [Hohfeld's] work is a severe disciplinary
process."' ' As stated in 1921 by Edwin Patterson, a Contracts scholar,
after trying to apply Hohfeld's terminology in his teaching, "it takes so
much thought to decide which Hohfeldian label to stick on that I tend to
lose sight of the real issues involved.
20 2
III. THE VALUE OF REDISCOVERING HOHFELDIAN TERMINOLOGY
The usefulness of Hohfeldian terminology is a matter of contention.
William Twining has asserted that
it is now widely accepted that his analysis ...has a less
widespread utility than was once thought, and that he failed
to substantiate his claims that reducing all legal relations to
their lowest common denominator would make it possible
to discuss common principles of justice and policy underly-
ing the various jural problems involved and that it would
increase 'one's perception of fundamental unity and har-
mony in the law.'
2 0 3
Samuel Williston, despite incorporating Hohfeldian terminology into the
Restatement, later wrote that it was unlikely lawyers and judges would ever
employ unusual words designed to create perfect distinctions, particularly
because legal vocabulary was already replete with words in common use
having more than one meaning.20 4 He also noted that "[o]nly after it was
determined that the plaintiff could or could not recover under a variety of
situations, could appropriate names for the legal relations become availa-
ble" and Hohfeld's system was therefore of diminishing importance in legal
education.2 0 5  And, as previously discussed, consistent application of
Hohfeldian terminology can be taxing, perhaps causing one to lose sight of
more important issues.20 6
These are fair criticisms, but to permit them to marginalize Hohfeldian
terminology is to ignore Hohfeld's stated purpose-to assist law students in
developing the ability to engage in legal reasoning. As noted by Professor
198. Linzer, supra note 7, at 271.
199. FRIED, supra note 22, at 53.
200. FISHER, supra note 138, at 8.
201. Foreword, supra note 1, at xi.
202. Hull, supra note 2, at 276 (quoting Letter from Edwin W. Patterson to Roscoe Pound (May
14, 1921) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)).
203. TWINING, supra note 2, at 34-35 (internal citations omitted).
204. SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 207 (1941).
205. Id. at 208.
206. See Foreword, supra note 1, at xi: Hull, supra note 2, at 276 (quoting Letter from Edwin W.
Patterson to Roscoe Pound (May 14, 1921) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)).
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Nyquist, Hohfeldian analysis trains students in at least five important lawy-
ering skills. 27 First, by having students focus on whether the court is using
imprecise language to explain the legal relations at issue, Hohfeldian analy-
sis trains students to read critically.2 °8 Second, it trains students to state the
issues in dispute precisely and to avoid ambiguous language.219 Third, by
requiring students to state the issues precisely, Hohfeldian analysis enables
students to better analogize and distinguish cases by recognizing when the
issues involved in superficially dissimilar cases are in fact the same, and
vice versa.210 Fourth, by requiring the legal relations between persons to
be broken down into their component parts, it trains students to sort out
complex legal relations. 211 Fifth, Hohfeldian analysis trains students to
avoid logical errors, particularly the errors of deducing duties from privi-
leges, deducing privileges from rights, and assuming that legal relations
among more than two persons must be identical.
212
This last skill is perhaps Hohfeldian terminology's most valuable use.
Not only will the careful use of Hohfeldian terminology train students to
avoid logical errors, its use will train them to recognize the logical errors of
their adversaries and the court, thereby providing them with a powerful
tool of advocacy. As stated by Williston, "whatever limitations there may
be to the value of analytical logic as a solvent of legal problems, it is one of
the weapons of an accomplished lawyer, and one which an intelligent be-
ginner can soon learn to use.
213
Accordingly, despite the limitations of Hohfeldian terminology, the
terminology's use remains "a powerful tool for teaching." '214 Yes, legal ter-
minology is not particularly interesting. No, Hohfeldian terminology does
not provide any help with which legal rules a court should adopt. And yes,
the terminology's use can be taxing. But, as anyone trained in Hohfeldian
terminology and analysis comes to realize, its use promotes a clarity of
thought about legal issues that is indispensable to truly thinking like a
lawyer.
IV. HOHFELD'S SYSTEM APPLIED TO CONTRACT LAW
In this Part, Hohfeld's system will be applied to contract law. This is
not, of course, the first time this has been done. Hohfeld's article included
contract-law examples;2"5 Corbin famously applied Hohfeld's system to a
207. Nyquist, supra note 20, at 246-53.
208. Id. at 246-47.
209. Id. at 247-48.
210. Id. at 248-49.
211. Id. at 249-51.
212. Id. at 251-53.
213. WILLISTON, supra note 204, at 209.
214. Nyquist, supra note 20, at 238. And to avoid having one's students petition the dean for your
removal, unlike Hohfeld, one need only use it in moderation. See id. at 245 ("I have found that once
students are familiar with Hohfeld's system, it is sufficient to signal when his vocabulary is in use, and
there is no need to apply it at all times.").
215. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 49-51.
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variety of contract doctrines in several law journal articles;216 Hohfeldian
terminology was used in the Restatement of Contracts;17 and Professor Ny-
quist, a contracts professor, provided examples of how Hohfeldian termi-
nology can be applied to contract law. 18 In this Part, however, Hohfeldian
analysis is applied to the entire spectrum of key contract doctrines, ranging
from contract formation to remedies, and thereby providing, for the first
time, a single source devoted solely to Hohfeldian analysis and contract
law. To organize the analysis, this Article groups contract doctrines into
four categories: (A) contract formation; (B) breach; (C) defenses; and (D)
remedies.
A. Contract Formation
Whether a contract is formed between two or more persons is impor-
tant because, upon formation, the legal relations between the parties imme-
diately changes. Under Hohfeldian analysis, the formation of a contract
does not create legal relations where none existed before (this would be an
error easily made by one not familiar with Hohfeld's system), but rather
changes the legal relations between the parties who have formed the
contract.
1. Legal Conceptions Contrasted with Non-Legal Conceptions in the
Formation of a Contract
Before analyzing contract formation doctrines using Hohfeld's eight
fundamental legal concepts, it is worthwhile to address the distinction be-
tween legal conceptions and non-legal conceptions in this area. Hohfeld
noted that confusing legal conceptions and non-legal conceptions was prev-
alent in the field of contract law, 219 and believed this was evident in the use
of the word contract.220 The word contract is sometimes used as a synonym
for bargain; contract is sometimes used to refer to a document that evi-
dences a bargain; and contract is sometimes used to refer to the legal rela-
tions resulting from a bargain.2 2 '
Under Hohfeldian terminology, only the third is correct. A contract is
a legal conception, and therefore the word should not be used to refer to
the physical facts necessary to bring a contract into existence. The word
contract refers to the legal relations that arise between two or more persons
upon the occurrence of operative facts.22 2 A written document signed by
each party that includes promises is a fact that might lead to a change in
216. TWINING, supra note 2, at 35.
217. Id.
218. Nyquist, supra note 20, at 242-43.
219. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 24.
220. Id. at 24-25
221. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 cmt. a (1981).
222. See Legal Analysis, supra note 67, at 165 ("The term 'legal relation' should always be used
with reference to two person, neither more nor less. One does not have a legal relation to himself.");
see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 15 (1932).
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legal relations between the parties, but the written document itself is not a
contract any more than a pocket watch is itself property.
Thus, when the parties to a bargain reduce the terms of their bargain
to a written document, it is best to avoid calling the document "the con-
tract." Doing so confuses a physical fact (the existence of a written docu-
ment with the terms of the bargain written on it) with the resulting legal
relation that might arise upon signing the document (a contract). It is
therefore better to refer to the document as the instrument and the result-
ing legal consequences as the contract.
Of course, it is unnecessary to do this religiously, and it becomes cum-
bersome to continually refer to the document as "the instrument." But
avoiding the use of the word contract to refer to the instrument is impor-
tant in cases where an issue is whether terms external to the instrument are
part of the contract. For example, the parol evidence rule does not pre-
clude terms extrinsic to the instrument from being part of the contract if
they are not contradicted by the instrument and it was natural to exclude
them.223 This distinction between contract (a legal conception) and instru-
ment (a non-legal conception) is also important in recognizing whether an
issue is one of law or fact. Whether a contract exists is, unless operative
facts are in dispute, an issue of law. 2 4 Whether an instrument existed is an
issue of fact to be decided by the fact finder.
Hohfeld argued that the operative facts in the formation of a contract
are an offer, acceptance, etc., 25 and Corbin concurred, stating that an offer
and an acceptance were operative facts for the formation of a contract. 2 6
But here, Hohfeld and Corbin made a misstep by exposing the mistaken
belief that only physical and mental facts give rise to legal relations. Some
of what Hohfeld and Corbin considered to be operative facts, and thus
non-legal conceptions, are legal conceptions. A careful review of the re-
quirements of contract formation-manifestation of mutual assent, capac-
ity, consideration, reasonably certain terms, and lawful purpose-shows
that each, except capacity, is a legal conception.
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 216(2) (1981).
224. See Ronan Assocs., Inc. v. Local 94-94A-94B, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 24 F.3d 447,
449 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Under traditional principles of contract law, questions as to what the parties said,
what they intended, and how a statement by one party was understood by the other are questions of
fact; however, the matter of whether or not there was a contract, in light of the factual findings on these
questions, is an issue of law.").
225. Hohfeld, supra note 3, at 26.
226. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some Resulting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J.
169, 170-71 (1917) [hereinafter Offer and Acceptance]; Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of
Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 739, 739 (1919) [hereinafter Conditions] ("A says to B, 'If you will agree to pay
me $100 for this horse you may have him and you may indicate your agreement by taking him.' This is
a physical fact, called an offer, consisting of certain muscular acts of A (his spoken words) producing
certain physical effects in B.").
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Take, for example, a requirement that a contract include a manifesta-
tion of mutual assent, which usually takes the form of an offer and an ac-
ceptance.227 By using the term manifestation, only physical facts, and not
mental facts, are sufficient to establish this element. This is one of the dis-
tinctive features of the so-called objective theory of contract.228 If this
were the only distinctive feature of the objective theory of contract, it
would simply mean that the requirements of offer and acceptance are lim-
ited to certain types of operative facts-physical facts-and would in no
way undermine Hohfeld's and Corbin's belief that the requirements of of-
fer and acceptance are operative facts.
But contract law only considers a person to have manifested an inten-
tion if the person had reason to believe the recipient will infer such an in-
tention from the physical acts.2 29 And the "reason to believe" standard is a
negligence standard. 3 ° Whether a person was negligent, however, is a
matter of opinion, drawn from facts. An apparent operative fact (such as
offer or acceptance) includes, as a requirement to determine if the appar-
ent operative fact exists, a conclusion that is debatable (e.g., did the
speaker have reason to believe the recipient would construe his words as a
manifestation to enter into an agreement?). It becomes clear that the ap-
parent operative facts-such as offer and acceptance-are not facts at all.
Consider the well-known case of Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry
Goods Co., 231 in which the defendant's president, in response to the plain-
tiff's offer for a year of reemployment, allegedly said, "Go ahead, you're all
right. Get your men out, and don't let that worry you. 232 The defendant's
president denied making this statement,233 and whether he made it was
therefore an issue of fact. But the appellate court assumed he said it, and
addressed whether such statement, if made, would have been an accept-
ance of the plaintiff's offer for reemployment.234 This was not an issue of
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22(1) (1981) ("The manifestation of mutual as-
sent to an exchange ordinarily takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an
acceptance by the other party or parties.").
228. See City of Everett v. Sumstad's Estate, 631 P.2d 366, 367 (Wash. 1981) ("The objective mani-
festation theory of contracts, which is followed in this state, lays stress on the outward manifestation of
assent made by each party to the other. The subjective intention of the parties is irrelevant.") (citation
omitted); see also Holmes, supra note 70, at 463-64 ("We talk about a contract as a meeting of the minds
of the parties, and thence it is inferred in various cases that there is no contract because their minds
have not met; that is, because they have intended different things or because one party has not known
of the assent of the other. Yet nothing is more certain than that parties may be bound by a contract to
things which neither of them intended, and when one does not know of the other's assent .... In my
opinion no one will understand the true theory of contract or be able even to discuss some fundamental
questions inteligently until he has understood that all contracts are formal, that the making of a con-
tract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of
external signs,-not on the parties' having meant the same thing but on their having said the same
thing.").
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b (1981).
230. Daniel P. O'Gorman, Contract Law and the Hand Formula, 75 LA. L. Rv. 127, 127-28
(2014).
231. 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907).
232. Id. at 777.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 778-80.
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deciding whether an operative fact existed. Rather, it involved determining
whether the defendant's president had reason to believe that the plaintiff
would construe his alleged response as assent to the plaintiff's offer.
Similarly, determining whether an agreement has consideration re-
quires that the decision maker decide whether a reasonable person would
conclude that each party was at least partly motivated to enter into the
agreement to obtain what the other party was giving, based on what the
parties manifested.2 35 Thus, the facts can be undisputed but reasonable
persons might disagree as to whether a reasonable person would believe
the parties had manifested the requisite motivation. Because the objective
theory of contract applies to determining whether there is consideration,
the requirement of consideration cannot be proven true or false; rather, it
is a matter of opinion drawn from facts.
The requirement that the bargain have reasonably certain terms is also
not something capable of being proven true or false. Reasonable persons
might disagree on whether a missing term is material or whether a term
that is included is so vague that the parties' obligations are not sufficiently
definite.2 36 Also, whether a contract has a lawful purpose is an issue that
often requires a balancing of the interest in enforcing the promise against
the public policy against enforcement.237 Only capacity is an operative fact.
For example, a person has no capacity to contract "if his property is under
guardianship by reason of an adjudication of mental illness or defect.,
238
Determining capacity therefore does not require making an evaluation
from facts.
Thus, it is incorrect to state that the operative facts of the legal relation
called contract include an offer, acceptance, capacity, consideration, rea-
sonably certain terms, and lawful purpose. Each-save capacity-is a legal
conception that requires a fact finder to make an intermediary legal conclu-
sion drawn from facts. Thus, before concluding that a contract has been
formed, an intermediate step, between the fact finder determining whether
the operative facts exist and whether a contract was formed, is necessary.
Corbin seemed to recognize this necessary step between determining
the facts and deciding if they changed legal relations. As he stated with
respect to the process of contract interpretation:
235. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1981) ("Here, as in the matter of
mutual assent, the law is concerned with the external manifestation rather than the undisclosed mental
state ....").
236. See generally Daniel P. O'Gorman, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts' Reasonably Cer-
tain Terms Requirement: A Model of Neoclassical Contract Law and a Model of Confusion and Incon-
sistency, 36 U. HAw. L. REV. 169, 202-13 (2014) (discussing the reasonably certain terms requirement).
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981) (setting forth a balancing test when
a statute does not expressly provide that a bargain is void or unenforceable); id. cmt. b ("In doubtful
cases ... a decision as to enforceability is reached only after a careful balancing, in light of all the
circumstances, of the interest in the enforcement of the particular promise against the policy against the
enforcement of such terms.").
238. Id. § 13.
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The first step in this judicial process is the merely historical
one of determining what the operative facts were. What did
the parties say and do? What words did they use? Did they
execute a document? This historical determination is made
possible by evidence.
The next step is one of interpretation. In taking this step
the court may put itself to two question: first, what was the
actual state of mind of the contracting parties, their meaning
and intention at the time they said the words or performed
the other acts to be interpreted; second, what meaning do
the words and acts of the parties now express to a reasonable
and disinterested third party? .... If the actual intention of
the parties is not the same as the meaning that is now con-
veyed to a reasonable man, it is the latter that will more
often prevail .... 239
Also, when describing the operative fact that is necessary to create an of-
fer, he noted that "[i]t must be an act that leads the offeree reasonably to
believe that a power to create a contract is conferred upon him." 4 ' What a
"reasonable and disinterested third party" would believe is an intermediary
legal conclusion, not an operative fact.
Thus, by referring to the elements of a contract as its operative facts,
Hohfeld and Corbin failed to appreciate that between operative facts and
the creation of a legal relationship there often exist intermediary legal con-
clusions that are legal conceptions. The operative facts for contract forma-
tion-as opposed to legal conclusions derived from those facts and the
myriad of evidential facts-are actually quite limited: two or more persons
(a fact) whose property is not under guardianship by reason of an adjudica-
tion of mental illness or defect (a fact) each of whom made a manifestation
(a fact). After that, intermediary legal conclusions derived from those facts
must be made to determine if the legal relation called contract arose.
2. Fundamental Legal Conceptions in the Formation of a Contract
Hohfeldian terminology will now be applied to the formation of a con-
tract. Prior to formation, a party is usually privileged to act or not act with
respect to what has been (or will) be promised, and the other party has a
corresponding no-right with respect to the first party acting (or not acting)
in such a way. As stated by Hohfeld, "if A has not contracted with B to
perform certain work for the latter A's privilege of not doing so is the very
negation of a duty of doing so." Upon contract formation, these legal rela-
tions will change.
239. Conditions, supra note 226, at 740-41 (emphasis added).
240. Offer and Acceptance, supra note 226, at 182 (emphasis added).
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The first requirement for the formation of a contract is the manifesta-
tion of mutual assent.24' A manifestation of mutual assent ordinarily takes
the form of an offer and an acceptance.
242
a. Offer
An offer is (1) a manifestation of willingness to enter into an agree-
ment2 43 (2) that is communicated or delivered to the offeree 24 4 (3) with the
offeree justifiably understanding that her assent is invited and will conclude
the agreement without a further manifestation from the offeror.245 Only
the second requirement seems purely factual,246 though the concept of con-
structive delivery would be a legal conception. 47
To analyze the concept of offer in Hohfeldian terms, let us assume that
X, the owner of a pocket watch, is considering making an offer to Y to sell
the watch to Y. Even though X has a "right" in the broad sense of the term
to engage in the acts that would constitute an offer to Y, does X have a
Hohfeldian right against Y to engage in all of those acts? In other words,
does X's "right," in the broad sense of the word, to engage in such acts
correlate to a corresponding duty by Y to permit X to engage in those acts?
Analysis reveals that X does not have a Hohfeldian right against Y to
engage in all of those acts. This is because Y is not under a duty to X to
permit him to communicate or deliver an offer to her. The reason is clear:
Y has no duty to form an agreement with X because of the principle of
241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981) (stating that the formation of a
contract requires a manifestation of mutual assent).
242. See id. § 22 ("The manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange ordinarily takes the form of
an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by the other party or parties.").
243. See id. § 24 ("An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain .... "). It is
better to ask whether there has been a manifestation of willingness to enter into an agreement, as
opposed to a willingness to enter into a bargain, because the former divorces the requirement of consid-
eration from the requirement of an offer, and therefore aids in analysis. See Daniel P. O'Gorman,
Redefining Offer in Contract Law, 82 Miss. L.J. 1049, 1075-79 (2013) (explaining the confusion caused
by the Restatement's use of the term bargain in its definition of offer).
244. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 131 (4th ed. 2004). An offer must be communicated or
delivered to the offeree because an offeree is not responsible for an unintended manifestation of assent
unless the manifestation was the result of the offeree's negligence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. c (1981) ("[T]here must be either intentional or negligent creation of an appear-
ance of assent.").
245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) (providing the manifestation must
be "so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent ... is invited and will conclude
[the agreement]").
246. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not have a rule specifying when an offer is con-
sidered received by an offeree, but it does have a rule regarding when a written revocation, rejection, or
acceptance is considered received. See id. § 68 ("A written revocation, rejection, or acceptance is re-
ceived when the writing comes into the possession of the person addressed, or of some person author-
ized by him to receive it for him, or when it is deposited in some place which he has authorized as the
place for this or similar communications to be deposited .... ). Intermediary legal conclusions could
be necessary, for example, if there is a dispute as to whether the undisputed facts indicate whether there
was sufficient authorization.
247. Consider, for example, the concept of constructive delivery in property law. See Waite v.
Grubbe, 73 P. 206, 208 (Or. 1903) (holding there was constructive delivery when donor showed donee
where money was buried).
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freedom from contract.248 And if Y has no duty to form an agreement with
X, it would make no sense to say that Y has a duty to permit X to engage in
the acts necessary to make an offer to her. For example, if Y sees X coming
to her front door and knows he intends to make an offer to her to sell her
his pocket watch, Y has the privilege (the opposite of a duty) to not open
the door and thus frustrate X's effort to make an offer to her. Similarly Y
has the privilege to not answer her telephone when she sees it is X calling,
when she knows X wants to make her an offer. Thus, although Y probably
does not have the privilege to prevent X from manifesting a willingness to
enter into an agreement with her (this would likely breach a duty under
criminal law or tort law), she does have the privilege to prevent such mani-
festation from being communicated or delivered to her.24 9
A third party, however, has a duty in tort to not intentionally and im-
properly interfere with the formation of a contract between other par-
ties.250 Thus, a third party would be under a duty not to interfere
improperly with X making an offer to Y to sell his pocket watch to her. For
example, a third party has a duty not to wrongfully intercept the offer, and
thus X holds a corresponding right against the third party to not have the
third party wrongfully interfere with X making an offer to Y. The making
of an offer could itself even constitute tortious interference. 1
The law of tortious interference is a particularly good example of the
importance of Hohfeldian analysis, and of identifying the legal interest be-
tween two specific persons. For example, even though X does not hold a
right against Y to communicate or deliver an offer to Y, X holds a right
against the third party to not have the third party improperly interfere with
the communication or delivery of the offer to Y. What constitutes im-
proper interference (i.e., the scope of the third party's duty) and what con-
duct the third party is privileged to engage is a question Hohfeldian
analysis does not answer; it is a policy question to be decided by the
248. See Radecki v. Amoco Oil Co., 858 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1988) ("In the situation of a
typical, garden-variety offer to contract, the offeree is free to reject the offer without running the risk of
incurring liability as a result.").
249. There is, however, a notable exception, but it is statutory. Under federal labor law an em-
ployer and a union each have a duty to bargain with the other, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), and thus
each has the right against the other to make an offer. See N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133
F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943) ("As we view the statute, it is the obligation of the parties to participate
actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present intention to find a basis for agreement, and a
sincere effort must be made to reach a common ground."). Accordingly, an employer would breach a
duty owed to the union if the employer refused to permit delivery of an offer to it. But, again, that is a
statutory right, and it is noteworthy for the very reason that it is contrary to the common-law rule.
250. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979) ("One who intentionally and improp-
erly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to
liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether
the interference consists of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or con-
tinue the prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective
relation.").
251. See Datam Mfg., L.L.C. v. Magna Powertrain USA, Inc., No. 306202, 2014 WL 587052, at *13
(Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2014) ("[F]or tortious interference with a contract, the act of making a compet-
ing offer is not per se a wrongful act, but a wrongful act can be established if the evidence shows the
competing offer was made with malice, ill motivation, or unlawful purpose.").
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courts. 2  But Hohfeldian analysis does show that simply because X has a
"right," in a broad sense, to make an offer to Y does not mean that Y is
under a duty to permit such an offer to be made to her, or even mean that a
third party must refrain from all conduct that would thwart X's effort to
make an offer to Y (only improper interference is prohibited).
If X does not have a right to engage in all of the acts necessary to make
an offer to Y, does X has a privilege to engage in the necessary acts? X
would not have a privilege if X had a duty to engage in those acts since a
privilege and a duty are jural opposites. It is clear that X does not, how-
ever, ordinarily have a duty to Y to engage in those acts.253 As indicated,
the principle of freedom of contract includes freedom from contract, the
freedom to not enter into a contract.
There might, however, arise an unusual situation in which, through the
existence of certain operative facts, a duty arises to make an offer. The
celebrated case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. is perhaps such an ex-
ample.25 4 In Hoffman, the court held that the defendant breached an en-
forceable promise to enter into a franchise agreement with the plaintiff as
long as the plaintiff met certain conditions.255 Essentially, the court found
that the defendant had promised to engage in the acts necessary to make
an offer to the plaintiff, and then breached that promise by not engaging in
those acts, even though the plaintiff met the stated conditions.256 Thus, the
defendant breached its duty to make an offer.
A similar situation might arise in the construction industry when a sub-
contractor submits a bid to a general contractor. The bid might not consti-
tute an offer because a reasonable person might believe the subcontractor
did not intend to conclude a deal until any agreement was reduced to a
more detailed written document.257 But, similar to Hoffman, the bid might
constitute a promise to make an offer, thereby inducing reasonable reliance
by the general contractor on the bid by incorporating the bid amount in its
252. For example, no court would hold that a third party, upon becoming aware that X intends to
offer the pocket watch to Y for $50, is under a duty to refrain from making a better offer to X when the
third party desires the watch. But all courts would hold that the third party has a duty to not take an
envelope from Y's doorstep that includes an offer from X because the third party dislikes Y and does
not want Y to obtain the enjoyment of the pocket watch.
253. See Rights, supra note 86, at 521 ("B is under no duty to advertise his wares or to make offers
."): Gumaer v. Interior Credit Bureau, 627 P.2d 647, 648 (Alaska 1981) ("The offeror is under no
duty to make an offer.").
254. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
255. See id. at 274 ("The record here discloses a number of promises and assurances given to
Hoffman [by] Red Owl upon which plaintiffs relied and acted upon to their detriment. Foremost were
the promises that for the sum of $18,000 Red Owl would establish Hoffman in a store."). The court
held that the promise was enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id. at 274-75.
256. The promise was not itself an offer because the terms of the proposed franchise agreement
lacked so much detail that the parties' relationship was at the preliminary negotiations stage. See id. at
274-75 (stating that a contract had not arisen because the proposed franchise agreement lacked detail).
257. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 (1981) ("Manifestations of assent that are
in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented from so operating by the fact that
the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof; but the circum-
stances may show that the agreements are preliminary negotiations.") (emphasis added).
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own bid to the project owner.258 If the subcontractor revokes its bid after
the general contractor enters into the prime contract with the project
owner and before the general contractor and the subcontractor adopt a
written memorial of any agreement, the subcontractor might have
breached a duty to make an offer to the general contractor. Thus, in cer-
tain limited circumstances a duty by X to Y to make an offer to Y can arise
by X making an enforceable promise to Y make an offer.
But ordinarily X has no duty to Y to make an offer to her because Y
does not have a right against X to have him make an offer to her. He
makes the offer or not; the choice is his. Accordingly, X has the privilege
to engage in the acts necessary to make an offer to Y, and Y, although
having the privilege to interfere with X's attempt to make an offer to Y by
preventing communication or delivery of the offer to her, has a no-right
(the opposite of a right) with respect to X making an offer to Y.
Does X also have a power against Y with respect to making an offer to
her? It is tempting to say 'yes' (and this is the standard answer) 25 9 but the
answer is 'no.' It might be suggested that the answer is 'yes' because an
offer presumably gives the offeree a power to form a contract, and the for-
mation of a contract changes the legal relations between X and Y. But, an
offer might propose an agreement that lacks consideration;260 the offer
might be made by a person without legal capacity;2 61 an offer might be
made that does not include reasonably certain terms;262 or an offer might
be made that proposes an exchange with an unlawful purpose.263 In each
of these situations, the offer would not give Y the power to form a contract.
258. This is presumably why courts rely on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce the bid,
and not a contract theory, when the subcontractor attempts to revoke the bid before the general con-
tractor manifests assent. See, e.g., Dynalectric Co. of Nev., Inc. v. Clark & Sullivan Constructors, Inc.,
255 P.3d 286 (Nev. 2011). Such a bid, if considered an offer, creates an option contract, permitting the
offeree to accept the offer despite the subcontractor's attempted revocation. Drennan v. Star Paving
Co., 333 P.2d 757, 759-60 (Cal. 1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981). If the
general contractor accepts the offer, a contract is formed, and there would be no reason to rely on
promissory estoppel. See Banbury v. Omnitrition Intern., Inc., 533 N.W.2d 876, 881 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) ("[T]he doctrine of promissory estoppel only applies where no contract exists."). The distinction
could be important with respect to the remedy awarded, though the Restatement indicates that the
remedies might not be different. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) ("The
remedy granted for breach [when the promise is enforceable under promissory estoppel] may be lim-
ited as justice requires."); id § 87(2) cmt. e ("Full-scale enforcement of the offered contract is not neces-
sarily appropriate in ... cases [where foreseeable reliance on an offer creates an option contract].").
259. See Nyquist, supra note 20, at 243 n.19 ("[I]ssuance of an offer is... a power since it changes
a legal relationship of another (the offeree).").
260. For example, the offeror's promise might be limited to a promise to perform a pre-existing
legal duty. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981) ("Performance of a legal duty
owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration
261. See id. § 13 ("A person has no capacity to incur contractual duties if his property is under
guardianship by reason of an adjudication of mental illness or defect.").
262. See id. § 33(1) ("Even though a manifestation of intention is understood to be intended as an
offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contracts are reasonably
certain.").
263. See id. § 7 cmt. a (discussing "void" agreements).
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It might be suggested that the offer gives Y the power or the privilege
to form an agreement (if not necessarily a contract),26 4 but this would also
be incorrect. Although an acceptance does create an agreement, an agree-
ment, without more, does not change legal relations (for example, the
agreement might lack consideration, one of the parties might lack legal ca-
pacity, etc.), and thus would not always give the offeree a power. It is also
incorrect to say that the offeree has a privilege to form an agreement be-
cause privileges refer to the legal ability to engage in a physical act, and an
agreement is a legal conception, not a physical act. An agreement is de-
fined as "a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more per-
sons,"2 65 and the use of the term manifestation requires a conclusion
derived from facts. What an offer does is provide the offeree with the
physical power to make a manifestation that has reference to something that
would not exist had the offeror not made an offer.
Thus, although an offer will often give the offeree the power to form a
contract, it will not always do so. Accordingly, to state that an offeror has
the power to make an offer is incorrect because this assumes all offers cre-
ate a power or a privilege in the offeree. It would, however, be correct to
state that an offeror, who has legal capacity, has the power to give an of-
feree, who has legal capacity, the power to form a contract.
Lastly with respect to offers, X ordinarily has an immunity from the
power of Y to compel X to make an offer that would give Y the power to
form a contract. Ordinarily Y cannot compel X to give anyone, including
Y, the power to form a contract.
In conclusion, with respect to the making of an offer, X does not have
a right against Y to make an offer to Y because Y may interfere with X's
effort to communicate or deliver the offer to Y, but X has a right against
third parties to not have them intentionally and improperly interfere with
him making an offer to Y. X has a privilege against Y to engage in the acts
necessary to make an offer to Y, but as already noted, the fact that it is a
mere privilege and not a right means that Y can interfere with X's attempt
to communicate or deliver the offer to Y. Although X has the privilege to
engage in the acts necessary to make an offer to Y, it is incorrect to state
that X has the power to make an offer since an offer does not necessarily
change the legal relations between X and Y. X does, however, if X has
legal capacity, have the power to give Y the power to form a contract. X
also has an immunity from Y compelling X to make an offer to Y that
would give Y the power to form a contract.
264. The author of this Article has, in fact, previously made this very suggestion. See O'Gorman,
supra note 236, at 1086 n.211 ("If an offer does not necessarily provide the offeree with a power to form
a contract, the most that can be said is that the offeree has a privilege to complete the manifestation of
mutual assent.").
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
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b. Acceptance
Acceptance of an offer requires (1) a manifestation of assent (2) by an
offeree (3) to the terms of the offer (4) made in a manner invited or re-
quired by the offeror (5) while the law still permits an acceptance to be
made.266 At the outset, it is important to recall that an acceptance is a legal
conception because its elements consist of legal conclusions, not simply
facts (e.g., did the recipient have reason to know her words would be con-
strued by the offeror as indicating assent? Did the offeror have reason to
know that the recipient would believe she was an offeree? Did the recipi-
ent's response mirror the offer? Did the offeror manifest an intention that
acceptance be manifested in a particular way?). Accordingly, it is improper
to ask whether a recipient of an offer2 67 has a right or privilege to "accept"
an offer because right and privilege refer to physical acts. It is better to ask
whether the recipient of an offer has the right or privilege to engage in the
acts necessary to accept the offer.
Also, it is important to recognize that the effect of an acceptance de-
pends on the circumstances, including the offer's terms and the legal capac-
ities of the parties. Although an acceptance forms an agreement
irrespective of the offer's terms and the legal capacity of the parties,268 an
agreement does not itself change the legal relations between the parties. If
the offer proposed an exchange, the acceptance forms a particular type of
agreement-a bargain 269-but a bargain, like an agreement, does not itself
change the legal relations between the parties.27 °
If, however, the offer proposed an exchange, the exchange included
consideration, the bargain has a lawful purpose, and both the offeror and
the offeree have the capacity to enter into a contract, the acceptance forms
a contract, which does change legal relations, and thus the offeree would
hold a power upon receipt of the offer. It is a power even though the of-
feror usually retains the power to revoke the offer since the offeror, to
exercise his power of revocation, must communicate the revocation to the
offeree before acceptance, and thus the offeree has the ability to form a
contract even if the offeror desires to revoke. 271 The offeree's power to
form a contract will, however, be lost (i.e., terminated) upon the occur-
rence of any of the following six events: (1) the offeror's or offeree's death
266. Id. §§ 35, 50.
267. The term recipient is used instead of offeree because whether the recipient is an offeree is one
of the requirements of an acceptance. See id. § 50 (defining acceptance as a manifestation of assent by
an offeree).
268. See id. § 3 ("An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more
persons.").
269. See id. ("A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a
performance or to exchange performances.").
270. See id. § 35 cmt. c ("Exercise of the power of acceptance concludes an agreement and a
bargain, and thus satisfies one of the requirements for formation of an informal contract enforceable as
a bargain. But a contract is not created unless the other requirements are met. Thus there may be no
consideration; or impossibility or illegality may prevent any duty of performance from arising.") (cita-
tions omitted).
271. Offer and Acceptance, supra note 226, at 187.
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or legal incapacity; (2) receipt by the offeree of the offeror's revocation; (3)
lapse of time; (4) the offeror's receipt of the offeree's rejection (unless the
offeror manifested a contrary intention); (5) the offeror's receipt of the
offeree's counteroffer (unless the offeror or offeree manifested a contrary
intention); or (6) the non-occurrence of any condition of acceptance under
the offer's terms.
2 72
Because Hohfeldian analysis focuses on events that change legal rela-
tions, the following discussion will primarily focus on the situation in which
an acceptance will form a contract (not simply an agreement or a bargain),
and the offeree therefore has a power to form a contract.
With respect to an acceptance, does Y owe a duty to X to perform the
acts necessary to accept X's offer? The answer, of course, is 'no.' Under
the concept of freedom from contract she is under no duty to accept an
offer.
27 3
Does Y have a Hohfeldian right against X to perform the acts neces-
sary to accept the offer? The answer is ordinarily 'no' because under the
law X usually has no duty to permit Y to engage in such acts. Under the
rule of Dickinson v. Dodds,27 4 X, after making an offer to Y, usually has
the privilege to engage in the acts necessary to withdraw the offer prior to
an acceptance by Y, and also has the power to eliminate Y's power to form
a contract. Y therefore has a corresponding no-right with respect to X's
privilege to engage in the acts necessary to terminate Y's power to form a
contract, and also has a corresponding liability with respect to X's power.
In fact, X has a privilege to withdraw the offer even when X has promised
Y that he will not withdraw it, except under certain circumstances. 275
It is not X's right against Y to withdraw his offer in that Y does not
have a duty to permit X to withdraw it. For example, suppose that X has
made an offer to Y, and Y sees X walking toward her. Y, suspecting that X
might withdraw his offer, may manifest assent to X's offer and conclude an
agreement. Admittedly, Ys power to form a contract in such a situation is
limited by the doctrine of indirect revocation, under which the offeree's
power to form a contract is terminated "when the offeror takes definite
action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract
and the offeree acquires reliable information to the effect. '2 76 But there is
no rule that an offeree, who has not acquired reliable information to that
effect, must confirm with the offeror his continuing intention to enter into a
272. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 36, 38, 39 (1981).
273. See Rights, supra note 86, at 521 ("[An offeree] is under no duty to accept offers made to
him."); Arthur L. Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration, 34 YALE L.J. 571, 572 (1925) [herein-
after Options] ("[W]here A has made an offer to B, the latter has a choice to make between accepting
and not accepting.").
274. 2 Ch. Div. 463 (Ct. App. Chancery Div. 1876).
275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 cmt. a (1981) ("Most offers are revocable
.... [Tihe ordinary offer is revocable even though it expressly states the contrary, because of the
doctrine that an informal agreement is binding as a bargain only if supported by consideration.").
276. Id. § 43.
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bargain before accepting the offer, even if the offeree suspects the offeror
is having second thoughts.
Of course, the law could have provided that X does not, unless the
offer indicates otherwise, have the power to revoke his offer (at least for a
reasonable amount of time) and is under a disability to Y, with Y retaining
a power to form a contract (for a reasonable amount of time).2 77 In fact,
providing X with the power to terminate Ys power to form a contract has
caused enough concern that exceptions have arisen to the general rule, pri-
marily designed to protect and encourage reliance on offers.
Even under traditional rules, X does not have the power to terminate
Y's power to form a contract when X promises, in exchange for considera-
tion, to not withdraw the offer.2 78 But new exceptions have arisen and pro-
vide that X does not have such a power when (1) X makes the promise with
the requisite formality;279 (2) X makes a promise to keep the offer open
and it is reasonably foreseeable that Y will rely on the promise, and there is
reliance and injustice would result from permitting revocation;280 (3) Y
starts performing in response to X's offer of a unilateral contract;28' or (4)
X makes an offer (without a promise to keep it open) and it is reasonably
foreseeable that Y will substantially rely on it before accepting, and does
substantially rely, and injustice would result from permitting revocation.282
Thus, it is more accurate to state that X ordinarily has the power to termi-
nate Y's power to form a contract.
When X does not have the power to terminate Y's power of accept-
ance, the law states that an "option contract" exists.283 An option contract
is defined as "a promise which meets the requirements for the formation of
a contract and limits the promisor's power to revoke the offer. ' 284 The
promise can be express, implied-in-fact, or implied-in-law. 285 For example,
277. See id. § 25 cmt. b ("To provide the offeree with a dependable basis for decision whether or
not to accept, the rule in many legal systems is that an offer is irrevocable unless it provides
otherwise.").
278. Id. § 25 cmt. c; Jorstad v. Yates, 447 N.W.2d 283, 285 (N.D. 1989).
279. U.C.C. § 2-205 (2013).
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981); Ragosta v. Wilder, 592 A.2d 367,
370-71 (Vt. 1991).
281. Id. § 45; Eaton v. Eaton, No. 286-S, 2005 WL 3529110, at *6 (Del. Ct. Ch. Dec. 19. 2005); see
also K. N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, 1!. 48 YALE L.J. 779, 787 n.9
(1939) ("There is a fine flagpole outside my classroom window, with a golden crown on top, and some-
thing very lovely went out of my life two years ago when the cases finally compelled me to stop revok-
ing [my offer for the student to climb the flagpole] with the student almost up to the crown.").
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333
P.2d 757, 759-60 (Cal. 1958).
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1981).
284. Id. The phrase, with its use of "contract," is an unfortunate one because it suggests that a
promise to keep an offer open is only enforceable if given for consideration. But the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts defines contract as any promise that is enforceable, even one that is enforceable
without consideration. Id. § 1. Thus, under the Restatement, a promise that is enforceable under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel is a contract. Unlike Hohfeld's proposed terminology, which by nar-
rowing the definition of terms avoids confusion and logical errors, the Restatement's decision to adopt a
single word-contract-for all legally-enforceable promises surely has the opposite effect.
285. That the promise may be express or implied-in-fact is based on the fact "[a] promise ... may
be inferred wholly or partly from conduct." Id. § 4.
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as previously discussed, the law implies, as a matter of law, a promise to not
revoke an offer of a unilateral contract after the offeree begins performing
in response to the offer 286 or when substantial reliance on an offer is rea-
sonably foreseeable. 87
Because an option contract "limits the promisor's power to revoke an
offer, ' '288 the offeree's attempted revocation2 89 does not affect the offeree's
power to form a contract.29° Thus, if X promises Y $100 if Y walks across
the Brooklyn Bridge,291 once Y starts walking across the bridge, X is under
a disability. If Y completes the walk, Y has exercised her power to form a
contract and a contract is formed.292 Y has a privilege to engage in the acts
necessary to form a contract, but does not have a duty to engage in those
acts.2 93 Thus, X does not have a right to have Y walk across the bridge.
A related and difficult issue is whether the offeror in an option con-
tract retains the privilege to engage in the physical act of attempting to
revoke the offer or whether the offeror has a duty to not do so. For exam-
ple, even though, as discussed, the offeror does not have the power to ex-
tinguish the offeree's power to form a contract once an option contract
arises, 294 does an option contract also impose on the offeror a duty to not
tell the offeree that he is revoking the offer? If we use Hohfeld's synonym
286. Id. § 45(1); see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 59 (2d ed. 2009)
(recognizing that such an option contract is a legal fiction created for a policy reason-to protect the
offeree's reliance-but that it could be argued there is an implied-in-fact promise to keep the offer
open after the start of performance). Although Section 45's comment refers to a promise, see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. b (1981) ("The rule of this Section is designed to protect the
offeree in justifiable reliance on the offeror's promise .... ) (emphasis added), the promise is presuma-
bly the promise to perform if there is an acceptance, not an express or implied-in-fact promise to keep
the offer open.
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(2) (1981); see also id. § 87 cmt. e (noting that
in such a situation "justice may require a remedy").
288. Id. § 25 (emphasis added).
289. To avoid confusion, it seems best to limit the term revocation to a situation in which the
offeree's power is in fact terminated, as opposed to using the term to simply describe an offeror mani-
festing an intention to revoke the offer, irrespective of whether it has the effect of terminating the
offeree's power.
290. See id. cmt. d ("The principal legal consequence of an option contract is that.., it limits the
promisor's power to revoke an offer .... A revocation by the offeror is not of itself effective ....").
291. This is the classic unilateral contract hypothetical, suggested by I. Maurice Wormser. See I.
Maurice Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136. 136 (1916) ("Sup-
pose A says to B, 'I will give you $100 if you walk across the Brooklyn Bridge,' and B walks-is there a
contract?").
292. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45(2) (1981) ("The offeror's duty of perform-
ance under any option contract so created is conditional on completion or tender of the invited per-
formance in accordance with the terms of the offer.").
293. See id. § 45 cmt. e ("Where part performance or tender by the offeree creates an option
contract, the offeree is not bound to complete performance."); Offer and Acceptance, supra note 226, at
192 ("It must be observed that after such a part performance there is as yet no contract, for by hypothe-
sis acceptance was to consist of complete performance."); JEFF FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CON-
TRACTS 7 (2009) (noting that a unilateral contract "is concluded when the requested performance is
complete"); id. at 208 ("[T]he promisee either accepts by fully performing, or fails to accept by failing
to completely perform. Part performance is not an acceptance.").
294. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 cmt. d (1981) ("The principal legal conse-
quence of an option contract is that . . . it limits the promisor's power to revoke an offer .... A
revocation by the offeror is not of itself effective ....").
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for right, this will be based on whether doing so creates a claim by the
offeree against the offeror for doing so. A claim is defined as "[t]he aggre-
gate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court." '95
Let us return to the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical. Suppose X, after Y
starts walking across the bridge, comes upon Y and says to her, "I revoke
my offer." Does X's mere physical act of stating these words to Y provide
Y with a claim against X? The Restatement comments provide that com-
pleting performance of a unilateral contract, although a condition to the
offeror's duty to perform, "may be excused, for example, if the offeror pre-
vents performance, waives it, or repudiates." '296 It is clear that X, by engag-
ing in the physical act of telling Y that he revokes his offer, has not
prevented Y's performance since X has not prevented Y from finishing her
walk across the bridge. X has also not waived complete performance by Y
as a condition to his duty to pay her $100 because under the Restatement, a
waiver is a promise to perform despite the non-occurrence of the condi-
tion.2 9 7 X is doing the opposite of promising to perform.
If anything, X has repudiated. A repudiation is "a statement by the
obligor to the obligee indicating that the obligor will commit a breach that
would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for total breach... or a
voluntary affirmative act which renders the obligor unable or apparently
unable to perform without such a breach." '98 Even though a contract is not
yet formed (because Y has not accepted by completing her walk across the
bridge),29 9 X is indicating he will commit a total breach if Y accepts. And
even though X's duty to perform is conditional on Y accepting X's offer, a
repudiation can occur when the offeror's duty to perform is conditional on
the offeree performing first;300 the only difference is that here the offeree's
performance occurs at the same time a contract is formed. Thus, there is
no reason to reject the use of the term repudiation when referring to an
offeror's attempt to revoke an offer under an option contract. And be-
cause a repudiation excuses the non-occurrence of the constructive condi-
tion of the offeree's substantial performance,3 1 the offeror's promise to
295. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009).
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. e (1981).
297. Id. § 84(1); see also id. § 84 cmt. a ("[Tihe rule of Subsection (1) can be thought of in terms of
waiver of a defense not addressed to the merits .... ") (emphasis added).
298. Id. § 250.
299. See Offer and Acceptance, supra note 226, at 192 ("It must be observed that after such a part
performance there is as yet no contract, for by hypothesis acceptance was to consist of complete per-
formance."); FERRIELL, supra note 293, at 7 (noting that a unilateral contract "is concluded when the
requested performance is complete"); id. at 208 ("[Tjhe promisee either accepts by fully performing, or
fails to accept by failing to completely perform. Part performance is not an acceptance.").
300. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253 cmt. c (1981) (noting that repudiation can
occur "when performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises and one party repudi-
ates a duty with respect to the expected exchange before the other party has fully performed that
exchange").
301. See id. § 253(2) ("Where performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises,
one party's repudiation of a duty to render performance discharges the other party's remaining duties
to render performance."): § 225 cmt. b ("The non-occurrence of a condition may be excused on a vari-
ety of grounds .... It may be excused by a repudiation of the conditional duty .... ").
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perform upon the offeree completing performance matures (i.e., becomes
an unconditional duty) and a failure to perform is thus a breach of a duty,
even if the offeree fails to complete performance.
Such a rule is justified on efficiency grounds. In general, a party is
expected to avoid losses that could be avoided through reasonable efforts
and without undue risk, burden, or humiliation." 2 To show how the rule is
justified for the sake of efficiency, consider the well-known case of Rock-
ingham County v. Luten Bridge Co.,33 with a slight variation on the facts.
Assume that the county's offer was for a unilateral contract-a promise to
pay a specified amount of money if the company completed the bridge, and
assume that a reasonable person would construe the offeror as not wanting
a return promise as the method of acceptance. °4 Until the bridge is com-
pleted, there is no acceptance. 05 After the company starts building the
bridge, the county tells the company that it no longer wants the bridge
because it will not be building a road to it.
30 6
The county, of course, does not have the power to terminate the com-
pany's power to form a contract because once the company started building
the bridge, an option contract arose.30 7 But as in the real case-in which a
302. Id. § 350.
303. 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929).
304. The latter clause is necessary because phrasing an offer as "If x, then y," is itself insufficient
to render an offer as one for a unilateral contract. Although the first step in determining whether an
offer is for a unilateral contract is to look carefully at the offer's language, and although an offer for a
unilateral contract typically uses words such as "if" or "provided," "[tihe offeror is often indifferent to
whether acceptance takes the form of words of promise or acts of performance, and his words literally
referring to one are often intended and understood to refer to either." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 32 cmt. a (1981) (emphasis added). The Restatement illustrations demonstrate this. In each of
the following illustrations, the American Law Institute believed a reasonable person would construe the
offer as doubtful as to whether the offeror was seeking a promise or performance as the manner of
acceptance, even though the language suggests an offer for a unilateral contract: "A writes to B, 'If you
will mow my lawn next week, I will pay you $10.' B can accept A's offer either by promptly promising
to mow the lawn or by mowing it as requested." "A says to B: 'If you finish that table you are making
and deliver it to my house today, I will give you $100 for it.' B replies, 'I'll do it.' There is a contract. B
could also accept by delivering the table as requested." Id. at illus. 1 & 2. Although the language used
by the offeror suggests acceptance only by performance, the context suggests offeror indifference to the
manner of acceptance (or a case of doubt), which permits acceptance by either performance or return
promise. Id. § 32.
305. See Offer and Acceptance, supra note 226, at 192 ("It must be observed that after such a part
performance there is as yet no contract, for by hypothesis acceptance was to consist of complete per-
formance."); see Ferriell, supra note 293, at 7 (noting that a unilateral contract "is concluded when the
requested performance is complete"); id. at 208 ("[T]he promisee either accepts by fully performing, or
fails to accept by failing to completely perform. Part performance is not an acceptance.").
306. Rockingham Cnty., 35 F.2d at 303.
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45(1) (1981); see also id. § 25 cmt. d ("The princi-
pal legal consequence of an option contract is that ... it limits the promisor's power to revoke an
offer.... A revocation by the offeror is not of itself effective, and the offer is properly referred to as an
irrevocable offer."). Corbin, however, maintained that in such a situation the power of acceptance
should be terminated, because otherwise it might encourage the offeree to finish performance, an inef-
ficient act. Offer and Acceptance, supra note 226, at 189-90. Later in the same article, though, Corbin
stated that "[i]f the offer has become irrevocable, however [through part performance], the offeree still
has the power to create a contract by completing the requested acts, in spite of a notice to the contrary
from the offeror." Id. at 192. Later, he again repeated his proposed limitation on this general rule: "To
this rule there should probably be added some such rule as the following: If the continuation of per-
formance will increase the amount of the offeree's claim, the revocation shall be effective; in such case
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bilateral contract was formed before the company started building308-it
would be best if the company does not finish the bridge because the county
does not want it. The company's time and effort are better spent else-
where. There is no value to finishing a "bridge to nowhere" (except for it
to be periodically visited by curious law students and law professors).
Thus, the offeror's statement that it is revoking its offer changes the
offeror's conditional duty to perform to an unconditional duty to perform.
But is that enough to conclude that the offeror has a duty to not make an
ineffective statement of revocation to the offeree? Is the court-imposed
excuse for the non-occurrence of a condition (full performance and accept-
ance) the type of sanction that would make it a duty?
Corbin described a Hohfeldian duty as one where the party who
breaches the duty "will be penalized by society for disobedience, ' 30 9 and
will be penalized by "certain physical consequences in the form of action by
the agents of the state ... "310 This is consistent with Hohfeld's assertion
that the closest synonym to right (the opposite of duty) was "claim."3"'
When the law excuses the offeree's failure to complete performance and
imposes a duty on the offeror to perform despite the condition's non-occur-
rence, there are no physical consequences imposed by the state. As long as
the offeror performs his duty (which has now matured), there will be no
government sanction. Rather, the offeror's privilege has simply been re-
moved as a matter of law.
But Corbin also maintained that the government sanction necessary to
create a duty need not consist of affirmative action by the government:
It is not necessary to the existence of a jural duty that the
sanction or penalty should consist of affirmative action by
an officer. Suppose the only rule of law against homicide is
this: Thou shall not kill; if B shall kill A, B shall be outlaw,
and anyone (X) is privileged to kill him and to seize his
goods. Surely this would be sufficient to create a 'duty' not
to kill. The denial of the usual forms of protection, the ex-
tinguishment of 'personal' or 'property' rights possessed by
B before his wrongful act, is itself a sanction and a
penalty.
3 12
Corbin then provided a series of examples where he believed a duty existed
when "the societal penalty or sanction consist[ed] in the creation of new
and detrimental jural relations by rule of law alone without any affirmative
if the offeree can show with reasonable certainty that he would have performed in full, he shall be
entitled to the same damage as if the contract had been a bilateral contract in the beginning." Id. at 196.
It does not appear, however, that Corbin's proposal has been adopted.
308. Rockingham Cnty., 35 F.2d at 302, 304.
309. Legal Analysis, supra note 67, at 167.
310. Arthur L. Corbin, Jural Relations and their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 230 (1921).
311. Id.
312. Rights, supra note 86, at 519.
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judicial or executive action." '313 Corbin, however, argued that although
"[t]he societal sanction or penalty need not consist of affirmative action by
'officers of the law'... it must be such as to affect their action ... somehow
disadvantageously to the wrongdoer." '314 According to Corbin, an example
of a situation that did not involve a duty was "[a] creditor los[ing] a valua-
ble right when he releases his debtor, [because] this loss is not a societal
penalty for a wrongful act."
315
The question then-if one accepts Corbin's definition of duty-is
whether the offeror stating that he is revoking his offer is itself a wrongful
act (even though the statement is ineffective as a revocation) with the law
excusing the non-occurrence of the condition being a societal penalty for
such wrongful behavior.316 Corbin was himself equivocal on whether to
consider the offeror under an option contract as having a duty to not tell
the offeree that the offer was revoked:
In some instances the purpose of a promise may be the crea-
tion of some other legal relationship than duty between the
promisor and the promisee. Thus, A may make an offer to
B and may promise for consideration or under seal not to
withdraw the offer. This might be (and often has been) re-
garded as creating a duty in A not to change his mind or not
to notify B of such a change, but it should far better be re-
garded as creating a power in B to be exercised by accept-
ance and a disability in A to extinguish that power.3" 7
This suggests that Corbin believed the offeror has the privilege to tell the
offeree he was revoking the offer, just not the power to terminate the of-
feree's power to form a contract.
In the same article, however, Corbin then wrote, "It does not mean
that the option giver has merely a duty not to revoke, for breach of which
he must pay damages, although such a duty may exist; it means that he has
no power (that is, has a disability) to destroy the option holder's power." '318
Corbin similarly wrote in another article that "[i]n such case the offeror is
never privileged to revoke"3 9 and "[i]n spite of an attempted revocation,
the offeree still has the power of acceptance; while the offeror lacks not
only the privilege of revoking, but also the power to revoke."32 He also
wrote that the offeror is "deprived of both privilege and power."
321
Ultimately, this is an issue solely of semantics. Hohfeldian terminol-
ogy is not necessary here to avoid errors in reasoning because the law has
313. Id. at 520-21.
314. Id. at 522.
315. Id.
316. See id.
317. Conditions, supra note 226, at 745 n.13 (emphasis added).
318. Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
319. Offer and Acceptance, supra note 226, at 188.
320. Id. at 189.
321. Id. at 197.
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specified the consequence of the repudiation-the conditional duty to per-
form becomes unconditional.322 But referring to the offeror as having a
duty to not say to the offeree he is revoking the offer (even though it is
ineffective as a revocation) seems appropriate. Such a statement by the
offeror, when the offeror does not have the power to revoke, is properly
considered wrongful, and the law declaring that the offeror's conditional
duty becomes an unconditional duty has the characteristics of a negative
sanction.
More importantly, however, what neither the Restatement nor
Hohfeldian analysis answers is whether the duty to perform that matures
despite the offeree's failure to fully perform is a duty enforceable under a
bargain theory or some alternative legal theory. The issue is important be-
cause merely identifying a breach of a duty does not disclose the type of
remedy available for the breach. Presumably, if full performance is neces-
sary to accept the offer, the duty is not enforceable under a bargain theory,
and thus expectation damages (i.e., full enforcement) would not be an enti-
tlement.323 An offeree is, of course, discouraged from continuing to per-
form because a court might hold that any costs incurred after repudiation
were losses that were not caused by the repudiation. 324 But by failing to
complete performance (and accept the offer), the offeree does not know
what the remedy will be for the offeror's breach of duty. With an option
contract that can be accepted through a return promise, this issue would
presumably not arise, because the offeree need only provide a return
promise to form a contract and would thus be entitled to full enforcement
of the promise.
c. Consideration, Legal Capacity, Reasonably Certain Terms, and
Lawful Purpose
If there is an offer and an acceptance, an agreement forms.32 This, in
itself, is insufficient to change any legal relations between the parties. To
determine if there is a change in legal relations, one must continue the
analysis and determine whether the remaining elements of a contract exist.
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. e (1981).
323. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (providing that ordinarily a
party has a right to damages, measured by his expectation interest) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 87 cmt. e (1981) (stating that when a contract is formed despite an attempted revocation
of the offer because an option contract arose through reliance on the offer, "[flull-scale enforcement of
the offered contract is not necessarily appropriate..."); id. § 90(1) (providing that when a promise is
enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, "[tihe remedy granted for breach may be lim-
ited as justice requires").
324. A situation in which it might be reasonable for the offeree to complete performance is when
it would otherwise be difficult for the offeree to prove that she would have completed performance had
there not been a repudiation by the offeror. See id. § 244 ("A party's duty to pay damages for total
breach ... is discharged if it appears after the breach that there would have been a total failure by the
injured party to perform his return promise."); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 45 ilus. 1 (1932) (of-
feree must "prove that he would have complied with the terms of the offer" to have a right to dam-
ages). This would seem likely with many reward or "prove me wrong" offers.
325. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981) ("An agreement is a manifestation
of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons.").
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The agreement must have consideration, 2 6 which means it must be of a
particular type-a bargain327 -and must not be supported on one side sim-
ply by a promise to perform an existing duty.
3 28
The next question is whether each of the parties had legal capacity to
enter into a contract. For example, a person has no capacity to contract "if
his property is under guardianship by reason of an adjudication of mental
illness or defect.,32 9 As previously discussed, the term capacity denotes an
operative fact and not a legal conception. If a person does not have legal
capacity, the person has no power to enter into a contract. The bargain
must also have reasonably certain terms 33 ° and a lawful purpose.
331
A party cannot waive any of these requirements to the formation of a
contract.332 For example, an agreement that lacks consideration does not
become a contract when the parties agree to waive the consideration
requirement.333
B. Breach
Having applied Hohfeldian analysis to contract formation, this Article
now turns to the second topic-breach. Although the phrase "bundle of
rights, powers, privileges, and immunities" is commonly used to refer to the
legal interests associated with the ownership of things,334 it is fully applica-
ble to the legal interests associated with a contract. Similar to a person's
obtaining ownership of a thing, once a contract arises, a bundle of rights,
powers, privileges, and immunities, along with their correlatives (duties, li-
abilities, no-rights, and disabilities), arises between the parties to the con-
tract (and, to a lesser extent, third parties) that are different from the legal
interests between the parties prior to contract formation. In a sense, the
moment of contract formation might be called a "Hohfeldian moment," a
point in time in which the legal relations between the parties change, often
in dramatic ways.
Most importantly, any promise that was part of the bargain becomes a
duty to perform as promised (though it might be a conditional duty) with a
corresponding right in the other party to the performance. Before contract
formation, the offeror had the privilege to not perform any promises in the
326. See id. § 17(1) ("[T]he formation of a contract requires ... consideration.").
327. See id. ("A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a
performance or to exchange performances .... [T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain .. ");
HILLMAN, supra note 286, at 39 ("A bargained-for exchange is one kind of agreement (People can
make agreements that do not constitute a bargained-for exchange. For example, you and Alice can
agree that you will give her your piano as a gift.).").
328. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981) ("Performance of a legal duty owed
to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration .....
329. Id. § 13.
330. Id. § 33.
331. Id. § 178.
332. Omni Group, Inc. v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 645 P.2d 727, 729 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
333. See id ("[A] party cannot create an enforceable contract by waiving the condition which
renders his promise illusory.").
334. See generally J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REv. 711
(1996).
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offer and the offeree had a corresponding no-right with respect to compel-
ling the offeror to perform. But upon contract formation, the offeree's
privilege to not perform transformed into its jural opposite-a duty to
perform.
The non-performance of a contract duty, at the time performance is
due, is a breach,335 and its status as a breach is not affected by the conse-
quences (or lack therefore) of the failure of performance.336 Even if the
breach of the contract duty causes no loss to the holder of the correspond-
ing right, the government will penalize the breaching party by entering a
judgment of nominal damages against that party,337 publicly branding the
breaching party as a wrongdoer.338
Considering such rights and duties to arise at the time of contract for-
mation-and not before-is in some sense arbitrary.339 Because such
rights and duties can include conditional rights and corresponding condi-
tional duties, one could sensibly take the position that there are similar con-
ditional rights and conditional duties even prior to that Hohfeldian
moment of contract formation. For example, if X makes an offer to Y, X's
promise in the offer is in a sense already a conditional duty, a duty condi-
tional upon Y's accepting X's offer. But to render Hohfeldian terminology
useful, a line must be drawn somewhere, and it is customary to draw that
line at contract formation; pre-contract formation promises are therefore
not considered conditional duties.340
The parties have the power and privilege, by forming a contract, to
alter their legal relations in ways additional to the creation of "right-duty"
relationships. The parties might, for example, create a "privilege-no-right"
relationship by granting one of the parties a privilege where prior to con-
tract formation there was a duty. An example would be a contract provid-
ing a party with the privilege to enter the other party's land, where before
there was a duty to not trespass. The original duty is replaced with a privi-
lege to perform the act. Or, the parties might create a "power-liability"
relationship by granting one of the parties a power where before there was
a disability. For example, the contract might grant one of the parties a
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(2) (1981).
336. Rights, supra note 86, at 524.
337. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346(2) (1981).
338. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 1 (1986) ("Lawsuits matter in another way that
cannot be measured in money or even liberty. There is inevitably a moral dimension to an action at law
.... A judge must decide not just who shall have what, but who has behaved well, who has met the
responsibilities of citizenship, and who by design or greed or insensitivity has ignored his own responsi-
bilities to others or exaggerated theirs to him.").
339. Rights, supra note 86, at 513.
340. Id. at 513; see also Conditions, supra note 226, at 743 ("An offer is a cause (or condition) of
the power in the offeree. An acceptance is a cause (or condition) of contractual rights and duties.
Nevertheless in contract law it is not common to speak of these facts as conditions, although such usage
is not unknown. The term condition is more properly restricted to facts subsequent to acceptance and
prior to discharge."). Thus, because the requirements to the formation of a contract are not considered
conditions, their non-occurrence as a requirement for contract formation cannot be waived. Id. at 755.
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binding option to buy an item owned by the other party. 341 The parties
might create an "immunity-disability" relationship by granting one of the
parties an immunity where before there was a disability and corresponding
power. For example, a principal and an agent might enter into a contract
terminating the agency relationship and the agent's power to change the
principal's legal relations with third parties.
With the formation of a contract, the parties, except as prohibited by
public policy, 342 have the power and privilege to change their legal relations
in any way they desire. Of course, it is beneficial for them to communicate
their shared intention as clearly as possible so that the court is aware of
their intentions and can give those intentions their intended effect. In fact,
one of contract law's primary functions is resolving misunderstandings be-
tween the parties regarding how their legal relations changed as a result of
the contract they formed. But only a breach of a duty gives rise to a claim
for breach of contract.
As previously discussed, the terms of an instrument are simply facts
used to determine how the parties' legal relations have changed as a result
of the formation of a contract. The process of determining the parties' new
legal relations-the process of contract construction-is not directly impli-
cated by Hohfeld's theory of fundamental legal conceptions. This process
is a separate endeavor, dictated primarily by the objective theory of con-
tract,343 maxims of construction,344 and, when the parties reduce at least
part of the terms of their bargain to an instrument, the parol evidence
rule.34 5
Importantly, once a contract arises, the parties have a duty to perform
any implied-in-fact duties as well as any implied-in-law duties.3 46 When the
parties have entered into a bargain that omits essential terms, the court will
supply a term as directed by a statute (such as the U.C.C.) or, in the ab-
sence of a statutory directive, a term that is reasonable in the circum-
stances.3 47 The process of construing an instrument, and thereby
determining the resulting legal relations, is not a process of simply identify-
ing operative facts because, similar to the issue of contract formation, the
court must apply the objective theory of contract.348 Applying the objec-
tive theory of contract requires the court to reach legal conclusions derived
341. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 25 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1981) ("A promises B
under seal or in return for $100 paid or promised by B that A will sell B 100 shares of stock in a
specified corporation for $5,000 at any time within thirty days that B selects. This is an option contract
under which B has an option.").
342. See id. § 178 (rendering unenforceable terms against public policy).
343. See id. § 201 (setting forth how to determine whose meaning prevails).
344. See id. §§ 202, 203 (setting forth various rules to aid in interpretation).
345. See id. § 213 (setting forth the parol evidence rule).
346. See id. § 235(2) ("When performance of a duty under a contract is due any non-performance
is a breach."); id. at cmt. b ("Non-performance of a duty when performance is due is a breach whether
the duty is imposed by a promise stated in the agreement or by a term supplied by the court, as in the
case of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.") (parentheses omitted).
347. Id. § 204.
348. Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpreta-
tion, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 427 (2000).
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from facts (i.e., how would a reasonable person construe the parties'
manifestations?).
Hohfeldian analysis shows that one doctrine of contract construc-
tion-the so-called duty-to-read rule-is not really a duty at all (at least not
in the Hohfeldian sense). Under the rule, a party who signs an instrument
is considered to have manifested assent to its terms even if the party did
not read it.349 This does not mean, however, that the other party has a right
to have the party read the instrument. There is no government-imposed
penalty for not reading it. Although the law considers the party to have
manifested assent to all of the unread terms,35 ° the same result would at-
tach if the party had read the instrument before manifesting assent to it. A
better description of the rule would therefore be the "failure-to-read rule"
because this phrase avoids the suggestion that there is, in fact, a Hohfeldian
duty to read an instrument before manifesting assent to its terms.
The Reporter's Note to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states
that "[i]n Hohfeldian terms, the 'duty' to read is really the absence of a
right to be excused because one failed to read the terms of the offer.
3 5 1
This would suggest the offeree has a no-right and the offeror a correspond-
ing privilege with respect to holding the offeree to the unread terms. But, if
anything, the ability to enforce unread terms would be a power with a cor-
responding liability. Even this, however, would not really be accurate be-
cause the legal relations change upon the offeree's manifesting assent to
the unread terms. It has also been asserted that although phrased as a duty,
the duty to read is really a limitation "on what might otherwise be
rights. 3 52 This does not seem entirely correct either because what "right-
duty" relationship would have arisen had the party read the instrument is
unclear.
Rather, the duty-to-read rule simply has the effect of altering the legal
relations according to the terms set forth in the instrument. The rule treats
a manifestation of assent to an instrument as an operative fact with respect
to altering the relations as indicated in the instrument, whether the party
read the instrument or not.
The harm caused by the phrase "duty-to-read rule" is not merely se-
mantic. Take, for example, the doctrine of unconscionability, under which
a court has the discretion to refuse to enforce a contract term if the term is
349. Ursini v. Goldman, 173 A. 789, 792 (Conn. 1934).
350. Id.
351. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONrTRACrS § 23 cmt. e, Reporter's Note (1981).
352. Charles L. Knapp, Is there a "Duty to Read"?, in REVISrrING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP
OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 315, 317 (Jean Braucher et al., eds..
2013).
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unconscionable.3 53 A majority of courts hold that to establish unconsciona-
bility, a party must prove both procedural and substantive unconscionabil-
ity.35 4 Procedural unconscionability consists of a lack of meaningful choice
(usually because of unequal bargaining power) or defects in the bargaining
process that lead to unfair surprise. 5  Courts, when determining whether
there was procedural unconscionability in the formation of a contract,
often rely on the rule that a party has a "duty" to read an instrument
before manifesting assent to the document.356
Consider the following analysis by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in deciding, under Mississippi law, whether there was procedural uncon-
scionability in a particular case:
Under Mississippi law, a contract can be unconscionable in
one of two ways: procedurally and/or substantively ....
[T]he district court based its finding of procedural uncon-
scionability on its conclusion that the Illiterate Appellees'
professed illiteracy rendered them unable to comprehend
the arbitration agreement and that they therefore lacked
any form of knowledge about the agreement when they
signed it. The district court also appeared to rest its finding
of unconscionability on the fact that WM Finance failed spe-
cifically to inform the Illiterate Appellees that they were
signing an arbitration agreement after the Illiterate Appel-
lees had informed WM Finance of their inability to read.
We find both bases of the district court's unconscionability
conclusion unsupported by Mississippi law. First, the dis-
trict court erred in concluding that the Illiterate Appellees'
inability to read rendered them incapable of possessing ade-
quate knowledge of the arbitration agreement they signed.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that, as a matter of
law, an individual's inability to understand a contract be-
cause of his or her illiteracy is not a sufficient basis for con-
cluding that a contract is unenforceable . . . . Mississippi
courts have consistently held that parties to an insurance
contract have an affirmative duty to read that contract and
thus, knowledge of the contract's terms is imputed to those
parties irrespective of whether they read the contract ....
353. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2013).
354. Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 922-23 (N.D. 2005) ("The majority of
courts.., have held that a showing of some measure of both procedural and substantive unconsciona-
bility is required, and courts are to employ a balancing test looking at the totality of the circumstances
to determine whether a particular provision is unconscionable and unenforceable.").
355. Id. at 922.
356. See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Fin. Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2004).
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The same conclusion has been reached by this court and
other federal courts construing Mississippi law .... Accord-
ingly, we hold that under Mississippi law, the inability to
read and understand the arbitration agreement does not
render the agreement unconscionable or otherwise
unenforceable.357
The court's analysis suggests that the party who did not read the instrument
has breached some duty and that the penalty for such wrongdoing is en-
forceability of the instrument, a penalty that trumps an argument of proce-
dural unconscionability.
Such a view, however, misconstrues the consequence of a failure to
read under the duty-to-read rule, an error likely promoted by the doc-
trine's misleading name. The only consequence under the rule of a failure
to read is that the party is considered to have manifested assent to the
unread terms, a consequence that does not make reading the instrument a
Hohfeldian duty. And whether a contract term is unenforceable under the
unconscionability doctrine is an analysis that assumes the term is part of
the contract. Whether a court relies on a failure to read an instrument in
determining if there is procedural unconscionability is a matter of public
policy (for example, under the circumstances a failure to read might not
lead to "unfair" surprise or a party might be deemed to have waived the
privilege of challenging the term), but the duty-to-read rule itself says noth-
ing about it. A failure to recognize this distinction might impede a thor-
ough balancing of the relevant policy considerations involved in the
unconscionability determination by giving undue weight to the failure to
read the instrument (or, even worse, giving the failure to read dispositive
effect).
As previously discussed, a party's contract duty might be subject to a
condition. When a duty is subject to a condition, a party usually acquires a
power to terminate the duty if the condition does not occur and the condi-
tion's non-occurrence is not excused.358 In such a situation, the other party
has a liability. The reason the non-occurrence of a condition creates a
power to terminate the duty as opposed to providing for the duty's auto-
matic termination is because the non-occurrence can be excused by the
holder of the duty through waiver, as long as the condition was not a mate-
rial part of the agreed exchange. 59
For example, a constructive (i.e., implied-in-law) condition of a party's
duty to perform is that there be no uncured, material non-performance by
the other party of a contract duty that is due first.36 ° Whether there has
been a "material" non-performance is not an operative fact because such a
357. Id. (emphasis added).
358. The prevention doctrine, equitable estoppel, repudiation, impracticability, and disproportion-
ate forfeiture are doctrines that will excuse the non-occurrence of a condition. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CoNTRACrS § 225 cmt. b (1981).
359. Id. § 84(1).
360. Id. § 237.
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determination requires a legal conclusion as to whether the non-perform-
ance was material.361 The non-occurrence of this constructive condition
gives the non-breaching party the power to suspend performance of the
duty. 36 2 If the promisee cannot cure the material non-performance or does
not cure it within a reasonable time, there is a so-called total breach, giving
the promisor the power to terminate all of the promisor's remaining con-
tract duties.3 6 3 But either of these powers can be waived by, for example,
the non-breaching party's promise to perform despite the other party's
breach.3" Recognizing that the other party's material non-performance
gives the party a power reinforces the understanding that the power can be
lost.
A party does not ordinarily have the privilege to interfere with the
occurrence of a condition to its contract duty. This restriction is known as
the prevention doctrine, under which a party has a duty to not wrongfully
prevent the occurrence of the condition. 365 The sanction for breaching the
duty is having the party's substantive duty mature despite the non-occur-
rence of the condition (a subject previously discussed with respect to excus-
ing performance in response to an offer of a unilateral contract when the
offeror repudiates).366 Of course, the express or implied-in-fact terms of
the contract might provide that a party does have the privilege to interfere
with the occurrence of a condition to its duty to perform. An example is a
contract involving a contest. If two parties have a contract under which the
first promises to pay the second a sum of money if the second is able to
beat the first in a game of basketball, the parties have impliedly agreed that
the first has the privilege to attempt to prevent the occurrence of the condi-
tion to its duty to pay.
Hohfeldian analysis is particularly helpful in understanding the issue
of third-party beneficiaries, and helps show why the topic is better consid-
ered an issue of the defendant's breach of duty as opposed to being lumped
361. See Conditions, supra note 226, at 761 ("What constitutes substantial performance must be
determined with reference to the particular facts in each case. The question is always one of degree and
its solution must be doubtful in many cases.").
362. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 cmt. a (1981) (noting that "a party's un-
cured material failure to perform or to offer to perform . has the effect of suspending the other
party's duties...").
363. Id. § 242.
364. See Conditions, supra note 226, at 760 ("Where substantial performance by the plaintiff is a
condition precedent to the duty of immediate performance by the defendant, and this condition has not
occurred, the plaintiff can maintain no suit for the agreed price unless there is a waiver of the condition
by the defendant. If there has been a true waiver by the defendant, his duty of immediate performance
exists and the plaintiff can maintain an action on the express contract for the agreed price or its
equivalent. In such case, however, the plaintiff should not allege full performance of conditions; if he
does his proof will show a variance. The operative facts are the agreement, the incomplete perform-
ance, and the waiver, and these should be alleged. The facts that operate as a waiver may be either an
expression of consent by the defendant or such conduct as gives rise to an estoppel.").
365. See Sullivan v. Bullock, 864 P.2d 184 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (discussing and applying the
prevention doctrine).
366. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 cmt. b (1981) ("It may be excused by
prevention or hindrance of its occurrence through a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
.. .
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into a separate category called "third party rights and duties." The issue
involves whether the non-performance of a contract duty was the breach of
a duty owed to the third party. The general rule is that a non-party does
not have the privilege to sue for breach of contract,367 and although this
rule is a policy choice, it is consistent with the Hohfeldian notion that a
duty is owed to a specific person-the person holding the corresponding
right. Thus, only a person holding the corresponding right has the privilege
to sue for breach of the duty.
This, of course, was the basis for Judge Cardozo's holding in Palsgraf
v. Long Island Railroad Co., in which Cardozo held that the tort duty to act
with reasonable care is not owed to an unforeseeable plaintiff.368 Cardozo
stated:
The argument for the plaintiff is built upon the shifting
meanings of such words as 'wrong' and 'wrongful,' and
shares their instability. What the plaintiff must show is 'a
wrong' to herself, i.e., a violation of her own right, and not
merely a wrong to some one else, nor conduct 'wrongful'
because unsocial, but not 'a wrong' to any one.36 9
Cardozo's reasoning that a duty is not owed to someone who does not hold
a corresponding right was unassailable Hohfeldian logic, but what it did not
answer-what Hohfeldian logic never answers-is to whom the duty
should be owed. Judge Friendly, discussing Palsgrafs incorporation into
admiralty law, explained as follows:
In Sinram v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F.2d 767, 770 (2 Cir.
1932), which received Palsgraf [sic] into the admiralty, Judge
Learned Hand characterized the issue in that case as
'whether, if A. omitted to perform a positive duty to B., C.,
who had been damaged in consequence, might invoke the
breach, though otherwise A. owed him no duty; in short,
whether A. was chargeable for the results to others of his
breach of duty to B.' Thus stated, the query rather answers
itself; Hohfeld's analysis tells us that once it is concluded
that A. had no duty to C., it is simply a correlative that C.
has no right against A. The important question is what was
the basis for Chief Judge Cardozo's conclusion that the
Long Island Railroad owed no 'duty' to Mrs. Palsgraf under
the circumstances.
370
367. Brooks v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 20 A.3d 890, 900 (N.H. 2011) (stating that "the general
rule [is] that a non-party to a contract has no remedy for breach of contract").
368. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
369. Id. at 100.
370. Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 721 (2d Cir. 1964).
[VOL. 33:317
2015] CONTRACT LAW & FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 367
A contract duty is of course owed to the other party to the contract,
the person to whom the promise was made. But Hohfeldian analysis does
not answer whether the duty should or should not also be owed to a partic-
ular non-party; that can only be determined as a matter of policy. 371 Courts
have answered that question by holding that a party owes a duty to per-
form to a non-party if a reasonable person would believe the parties to the
contract entered into the contract intending that performance be for the
non-party's benefit.372
The law of the assignment of contract rights is also better considered
as part of the topic of breach of duty, as opposed to the amorphous topic of
"third-party rights and duties." When a right holder assigns her contract
right to a third party, the holder of the corresponding duty has his duty
shifted to the assignee.373 Failure to provide the promised performance to
the third party is, therefore, a breach of the duty. Because the assignor has
the ability to change the legal relations between the parties to the contract
and the third party, the assignor has a power to assign the contract right.
Hohfeldian analysis also explains why an assignment can be effective
(i.e., change legal relations) even if it is in breach of an anti-assignment
clause. Unless the contract provides otherwise, a valid anti-assignment
clause does not render an assignment ineffective, but merely gives the obli-
gor a claim for breach of contract. 374 As explained by Nigel Simmonds:
I may have the "power" (in Hohfeld's sense) to perform an
act and yet not have the liberty [privilege] to do so. In cer-
tain cases, for example, a non-owner can pass good title to a
bona fide purchaser for value. In such a case, the non-
owner has the power to transfer title, since his acts will be
legally effective in making the purchaser the owner of the
goods. But the exercise of that power may still be a breach of
duty: although effective in transferring title, it may still be a
legal wrong. Since a liberty is the absence of a duty not to
do the act, it is clear that the non-owner in such a case has
the power to transfer, but not the liberty to do so. Imagine
how confusing it would be if we did not possess the
Hohfeldian vocabulary, but had to refer to both powers and
371. Attempts to construct the rights of third parties (or lack thereof) from deductive reasoning
caused doctrinal difficulties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTS ch. 14, intro, note (1981)
("Historically, the rights of contract beneficiaries have been the subject of doctrinal difficulties in both
England and the United States.").
372. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CorNrRACTs §§ 302, 304, 315 (1981). The Restatement states that
the law recognizes "the power of promisor and promisee to create rights in a beneficiary by manifesting
an intention to do so." Id. ch. 14, intro, note (emphasis added).
373. Id. § 317(1).
374. Id. § 322(2)(b). An example of "when the contract provides otherwise" would be when the
contract provides that any attempted assignment is "void." Allhusen v. Caristo Constr. Corp., 103
N.E.2d 891, 893 (N.Y. 1952). Simply stating that the parties "promise" to not assign their contract
fights (or similar language of a promissory nature) is insufficient. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 322 cmt. b (1981).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
liberties as rights. We would then have to say that the non-
owner has the right to transfer, but does not have the right
to transfer!
375
Similarly, without Hohfeldian vocabulary, we would have to say that when
a contract has an anti-assignment clause simply stating that the parties
promise not to assign any contract rights, the putative assignor has the right
to assign her contract rights, but does not have the right to assign her con-
tract rights.
With respect to the delegation of duties,376 the issue is whether and to
what extent an attempted delegation changes the legal relations of the par-
ties to the contract and with third parties. If the delegation is ineffective,
the legal relations do not change. If the delegation is effective, a perform-
ance by the delegatee has the effect of discharging the delegator's duty
owed to the obligee and terminating the obligee's right.3 77 The delegator's
duty is not, however, discharged until either the delegator or delegatee per-
forms.378 Because the delegator retains the duty to perform, the legal rela-
tions between the delegator and the obligee do not change upon a
delegation (thus, a party who may delegate has a privilege to delegate, but
not a power to delegate). But, if the delegatee made an enforceable prom-
ise to perform, the relations between the delegator and the delegatee
change (a "right-duty" relationship arises) and the relations between the
delegatee and the obligee change (a "right-duty" relationship arises based
on intended beneficiary law, with the delegatee owing a duty of perform-
ance to the obligee).379
The issue of repudiation (often called anticipatory repudiation or an-
ticipatory breach) is particularly interesting with respect to Hohfeldian
analysis. A repudiation is "a statement by the obligor to the obligee indi-
cating that the obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give the
obligee a claim for damages for total breach.., or a voluntary affirmative
act which renders the obligor unable or apparently unable to perform with-
out such a breach."380 The obligor's statement or act is an operative fact,
but whether the statement or act constitutes a repudiation is a legal conclu-
sion derived from a consideration of the statement or act. The conse-
quences of a repudiation are that even though there has not yet been a
breach of the duty to perform, the repudiation gives rise to an immediate
claim for (i.e., right to) damages for total breach, discharges the other
party's remaining duties, and excuses the non-occurrence of any conditions
to the repudiating party's duties.38 '
375. SIMMONDS, supra note 123, at 299-300 (emphasis added).
376. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 (1981).
377. Id. § 318(1), (2).
378. Id. § 318(3).
379. See id. § 302 cmt. d (noting that an intended beneficiary relationship can arise upon "a prom-
ise to perform a supposed or asserted duty of the promisee").
380. Id. § 250.
381. Id. cmt. a.
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A repudiation is not itself a breach of the duty to perform because the
performance is not due yet. 382 But as previously discussed with respect to a
statement of revocation of an offer under an option contract, a repudia-
tion's consequences are best viewed as a penalty for engaging in the physi-
cal act of making the statement or taking the action that constitutes a
repudiation. In fact, the Restatement comment states that a repudiation
"may impair the value of the contract to the other party.383 This comment
suggests that a repudiation is considered a wrongful act, even though pro-
viding notice of a future breach will in many instances be beneficial to the
non-repudiating party by, for example, permitting the party to save ex-
penses in anticipation of performance and to obtain substitute performance
sooner. Thus, if employing Hohfeldian terminology, it seems appropriate
to state that a party has a duty not to engage in the physical acts constitut-
ing repudiation, and that the other party has a corresponding right not to
have the party engage in such acts.
C. Defenses
There are a number of defenses that can be asserted by a defendant,
and these can be divided into their legal consequences: (1) those that
render a contract voidable by one or more of the parties; (2) those that
render a contract or contract duty unenforceable; and (3) those that auto-
matically discharge a contract duty. Each category is analyzed below
within the Hohfeldian schema.
1. Voidable Doctrines
The defenses that render a contract voidable include mutual mis-
take,384 unilateral mistake,385 misrepresentation,386 duress,38 7 undue influ-
ence, 38 8 the infancy doctrine, 389 mental infirmity,39 ° and intoxication. 391 "A
voidable contract is one where one or more parties have the power, by a
manifestation of election to do so, to avoid the legal relations created by
the contract" and revert to the legal relations that existed before contract
formation.392 Whether a party has such a Hohfeldian power under any of
the foregoing doctrines is determined by operative facts and the legal con-
clusions drawn from those facts.
These doctrines provide a party with the Hohfeldian power to void the
contract, with the term contract being used in a Hohfeldian sense. Thus, all
382. See id. § 235(2) ("When performance of a duty under a contract is due any non-performance
is a breach.") (emphasis added).
383. See id. § 250 cmt. a.
384. Id. § 152.
385. Id. § 153.
386. Id. § 164.
387. Id. § 175.
388. Id. § 177.
389. Id. § 14.
390. Id. § 15.
391. Id. § 16.
392. Id. § 7 (emphasis added).
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legal relations that arose because of contract formation are extinguished,
and the parties' pre-contract legal relations replace them. Restitution is
permitted because the duty to return or pay for benefits when it would be
unjust not to do so is a duty that exists independently of a contract.393 Al-
though a party who has the power to void the contract does not have a duty
to perform, a contract still arises because the promise is consideration.3 94
Although these doctrines provide a party with a Hohfeldian power to
terminate the contractual relations that arose out of contract formation, the
power can be lost if not exercised. 395 This is known as the doctrine of ratifi-
cation, under which a party will lose the power to terminate the contractual
relations if the party engages in an act inconsistent with the desire to termi-
nate the contractual relations, or delays exercising the power.396 Ratifica-
tion is the equivalent of a waiver.
An interesting, but solely semantic, question is whether a party is
under a Hohfeldian duty not to make a misrepresentation or an improper
threat (duress) or not to enter into a contract with a minor, person with
mental defect, or an intoxicated person. In other words, is the law's grant
of a power to void the contract a penalty for wrongdoing? The issue is
purely semantic because the law is clear regarding the consequence of
these events, and determining whether there is a Hohfeldian duty will not
change these consequences. Because the consequence is to make the con-
tract binding upon one party but not the other, the consequence has the
nature of a penalty, though only misrepresentation and duress would seem
to constitute wrongdoing in all cases (though an innocent misrepresenta-
tion might not be considered wrongdoing). Accordingly, it seems appropri-
ate to consider the party as having a duty not to make a misrepresentation
or to make an improper threat. Similarly, it seems appropriate to consider
a party as having a duty to disclose facts in those circumstances where a
failure to disclose constitutes a misrepresentation.397 But one must remem-
ber that the breach of a duty does not always provide the right-holder with
a cause of action for damages.
2. Unenforceable Doctrines
A variety of grounds exist for making a contract or a particular con-
tract duty unenforceable. For example, the Statute of Frauds renders cer-
tain contracts unenforceable; 398 the unconscionability doctrine gives the
393. Id. § 376.
394. Id. §§ 85, 7 cmt. e.
395. See id. § 7 ("A voidable contract is one where one or more parties have the power, by a
manifestation of election to do so, to avoid the legal relations created by the contract, or by ratification
of the contract to extinguish the power of avoidance.") (emphasis added).
396. See Daniel P. O'Gorman, Show Me the Money: The Applicability of Contract Law's Ratifica-
tion and Tender-Back Doctrines to Title VII Releases, 84 TUL. L. REV. 675, 682-85 (2010) (discussing
ratification doctrine).
397. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981) (setting forth situations in which a
non-disclosure is equivalent to a misrepresentation).
398. Id. § 138.
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court the discretion to not enforce certain contracts or contract terms;
399
and public policy might render unenforceable a particular duty within a
bargain that is not entirely void.n° °
An unenforceable contract or contract duty is different from a voida-
ble contract in that an unenforceable contract duty does not provide a
party with the Hohfeldian power to terminate the contract or the particular
duty.4" 1 Thus, there is no ability to ratify an unenforceable contract duty 02
(though the Statute of Frauds provides that an unenforceable contract will
become enforceable if a sufficient writing is created).40 3 The unconsciona-
bility doctrine differs from the other two doctrines in that the court has
discretion whether to decline enforcement.0 4
An unenforceable contract duty still remains a Hohfeldian duty be-
cause there might be negative consequences from failing to perform as
promised. For example, if a debtor has an unenforceable duty to pay a
creditor, the creditor might still be permitted to apply the amount owed
toward any security held by the creditor. 5 This is consistent with the pre-
vious discussion regarding a Hohfeldian duty being recognized in situations
where the law attaches negative consequences other than creating the abil-
ity to sue.
Under the Statute of Frauds, the entire contract is rendered unen-
forceable, meaning that all of the "right-duty" relationships created by con-
tract formation are unenforceable.40 6 Under the unconscionability and
public-policy doctrines, the court has discretion as to whether an unen-
forceable, unconscionable, "right-duty" relationship has the effect of ren-
dering other "right-duty" relationships within the contract
unenforceable. 0 7
399. Id. § 208; U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2013).
400. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 8 cmt. b (1981) ("Some contracts are unen-
forceable because they arise out of illegal bargains which are neither wholly void nor voidable.").
401. See id. § 8 cmt. a ("[T]he term unenforceable contract refers to rules under which the duty of
performance does not depend solely on the election of one party.").
402. See id. ("In the transactions here classified as unenforceable, some legal consequences other
than the creation of a power of ratification follow without further action by either party.").
403. Id. § 131.
404. See id. § 208 ("If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made
a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any uncon-
scionable result.") (emphasis added); U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2013) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the uncon-
scionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any uncon-
scionable result.") (emphasis added).
405. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 8 cmt. a, illus. 2 (1981).
406. Id. § 138.
407. See id. § 184(1) ("If less than all of an agreement is unenforceable [because of public policy],
a court may nevertheless enforce the rest of the agreement in favor of a party who did not engage in
serious misconduct if the performance as to which the agreement is unenforceable is not an essential
part of the agreed exchange."); id. § 208 ("If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time
the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term
as to avoid any unconscionable result.").
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3. Doctrines that Discharge Duties
Some defenses result in the automatic discharge of a Hohfeldian duty,
which is different from the voidable doctrines in that the discharge is not
subject to a party exercising a Hohfeldian power to discharge, and different
from the unenforceable doctrines in that no Hohfeldian duty of any kind
remains. These doctrines include the doctrines of supervening impractica-
bility4"8 and supervening frustration of purpose.40 9 Thus, it would be incor-
rect to state that upon the occurrence of the event the adversely affected
party has the Hohfeldian power to void the contract or that the duty is
rendered unenforceable. Rather, the duty is discharged.
Corbin considered the non-occurrence of an event rendering perform-
ance impracticable to be a condition to the Hohfeldian duty to perform,410
but the use of the term condition here is problematic. Corbin rejected the
term condition for the requirements of the formation of a contract (offer,
acceptance, etc.) in part because such requirements could not be waived,
unlike post-formation conditions. 41' But under the law of impracticability
and frustration of purpose, the duty is automatically discharged upon the
occurrence of the events. Referring to the non-occurrence of these events
as conditions would suggest the duty can mature despite the occurrence of
the event through the doctrine of waiver. Presumably, the event's non-
occurrence is not subject to waiver because it is such a significant event that
the event's non-occurrence is considered a material part of the agreed
exchange.412
Under the doctrine of impracticability, the duty whose performance
was impracticable is discharged, and whether this discharge has the effect
of discharging the other party's remaining duties is a separate analysis.413
Under the doctrine of frustration of purpose, all of the remaining duties of
the party whose principal purpose for entering into the contract was sub-
stantially frustrated are discharged.41 4 Like impracticability, whether this
discharge has the effect of discharging the other party's remaining duties is
a separate analysis.415
408. See id. § 261 ("Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or
the circumstances indicate the contrary.") (emphasis added).
409. Id. § 265 ("Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frus-
trated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assump-
tion on which the contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless
the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.") (emphasis added).
410. Conditions. supra note 226, at 755.
411. Id.
412. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CoNTRACrs§ 84(1)(a) (1981) (providing that a condition
cannot be waived if "occurrence of the condition was a material part of the agreed exchange for the
performance of the duty and the promisee was under no duty that it occur").
413. Id. § 267.
414. Id. § 265.
415. Id. § 267.
[VOL. 33:317
2015] CONTRACT LAW & FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 373
D. Remedies
A breach of a contract duty means that a new Hohfeldian duty arises
to pay compensatory damages to the non-breaching party, and the non-
breaching party acquires a Hohfeldian right to such damages.416 Of course,
in contract law, compensatory damages means an amount designed to put
the non-breaching party in the position she would have been in had the
contract been performed.417 Corbin called the correlative of such a duty,
which arises upon the breach of some other duty, a secondary right or a
remedial right.4 18 Farnsworth called a damages remedy "substitutional" be-
cause "it is intended to give the promisee something in substitution for the
promised performance." '419 There is no right to specific performance be-
cause such an award is within the court's discretion.42 °
One could consider the primary duty as simply an option to perform or
pay damages, 421 and thus consider a contract duty as including a
Hohfeldian privilege to either perform or pay damages. Such a characteri-
zation is consistent with the view that failing to perform is not always
wrongful, particularly when the breach results in greater overall benefits
than performance.422 But, as Corbin noted,
[i]t is not usual to say, however, that he has an option be-
tween these two alternatives. Society approves one of them
[and] disapproves the other and penalizes it in various ways.
So we say that B is not legally privileged to adopt the latter
alternative. He is bound by legal duty. He has no option.423
Accordingly, in specifying the Hohfeldian duty, it is preferable to state that
a party has a contract duty to perform as promised, not simply a duty to
either perform as promised or pay damages.
The fact that the secondary duty is a duty distinct from the primary
duty shows that the scope of the secondary duty is a policy choice that does
not flow, as a matter of deductive reasoning, from the scope of the primary
duty. That the remedy is a policy choice is, of course, what Lon Fuller
famously pointed out when asking why expectation damages should be the
416. See id. § 346(1) ("The injured party has a right to damages for any breach by a party against
whom the contract is enforceable unless the claim for damages has been suspended or discharged.")
(emphasis added).
417. See id. § 347 ("[T]he injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest
. . . .11).
418. Rights, supra note 86, at 515-16.
419. Farnsworth, supra note 244, at 734-35.
420. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. c (1981).
421. This view has traditionally been attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., but Professor Pe-
rillo has shown this to be a misreading of his view. See Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell
Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FOROHAM L. REv. 1085, 1085-87 (2000).
422. This is the idea of an "efficient breach." See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND EcONOMics 33-36 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing efficient-breach theory).
423. Options, supra note 273, at 572.
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standard remedy for the breach of a contract duty.4 24 Recognizing that the
remedy is a policy choice is what also makes understandable the court's
discretion to award expectation damages for the breach of a duty derived
from promissory estoppel, even though the duty is made enforceable as a
result of the promisee's reliance.425
The secondary duty is only a duty to pay for losses caused by the
breach of the primary duty426 whose amount can be proved to a reasonable
certainty, 427 that were sufficiently foreseeable at the time the parties en-
tered into the contract, 428 and that could not have been avoided through
reasonable efforts by the non-breaching party.429 Thus, these doctrines
limit the scope of the secondary duty.
With respect to the limitation for those losses that could have been
avoided, the phrase "duty to mitigate damages," like the phrase "duty-to-
read rule," is an example where the term duty is not used in a Hohfeldian
sense:
When A has broken his contract with B, and B can, by stop-
ping work, easily prevent his loss from increasing, it is often
said that B is under a 'duty to mitigate damages.' It has
been judicially observed, however, that there is no such
duty. B's failure to mitigate his loss is not penalized by soci-
ety. B's right to damages was created and the amount com-
puted as of the time of A's final breach. Thereafter B's
failure to discontinue work changes in no respect his jural
relations with A. Of course, B is losing money by reason of
his action; but so also does he lose money when he throws it
into the sea, yet he is under no duty not to throw it there.430
What this analysis recognizes is that the avoidable loss doctrine is really
just a subset of the doctrine that the breaching party only has a duty to pay
for losses caused by the breach.43'
424. See L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1),
46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
425. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) ("The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires."); id. § 90 cmt. d ("A promise binding under this section is a
contract, and full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is often appropriate .... [But] relief may
sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or specific relief measured by the extent of the
promisee's reliance rather than by the terms of the promise.").
426. Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 855 F.2d 888, 896 (1st Cir. 1988) (en banc).
427. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981).
428. Id. § 351(1).
429. Id. § 350.
430. Rights, supra note 86, at 521-22.
431. Cardozo adopted this reasoning. See McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 169 N.E. 605, 609-
10 (N.Y. 1930) ("The statement is made not infrequently in treatise and decision that a servant wrong-
fully discharged is 'under a duty' to the master to reduce the damages, if he can. The phrase is accurate
enough for most purposes, yet susceptible of misunderstanding, if emphasized too sharply. The servant
is free to accept employment or reject it according to his uncensored pleasure. What is meant by the
supposed duty is merely this; that if he unreasonably reject, he will not be heard to say that the loss of
wages from then on shall be deemed the jural consequence of the earlier discharge. He has broken the
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Viewed this way, the avoidable loss doctrine does not penalize the
non-breaching party, because it simply refuses to compel the breaching
party to pay the non-breaching party for a loss that the non-breaching party
chose to incur. If the doctrine is not viewed in this fashion, there would be
the incorrect appearance that the court is penalizing the non-breaching
party by not permitting a recovery for avoidable loss. A non-breaching
party has the privilege to throw his money away or to save it, but the
breaching party has no duty to pay for any money thrown away. Thus,
there is no Hohfeldian duty to avoid losses.4 32 Accordingly, a phrase pref-
erable to the "duty-to-mitigate doctrine" is the avoidable loss doctrine.
The parties have the power to define the scope of their secondary du-
ties by agreeing upon an amount of damages to be paid in the event of a
breach,4 33 though because the parties must agree it is more accurate to say
that one party has the privilege to offer such a provision to the other,
thereby providing the other with such a power. This power is limited, how-
ever, to the requirement that the losses be difficult to determine and that
the amount agreed upon be a reasonable estimate of the amount of loss in
the event of breach.43 4
E. A Final Note Regarding Hohfeldian Analysis and Contract Law
Having surveyed the key contract doctrines through Hohfeldian termi-
nology, an anticipated objection to the endeavor becomes apparent.
Hohfeld, whose work did not address Holmes's prediction theory of law,
considered legal relations to change upon the occurrence of operative facts,
without accounting for the legal conclusions that must be made by courts to
decide whether legal relations had changed and, if so, to what extent. Thus,
the Hohfeldian moment of contract formation will often leave the parties
unsure as to whether and to what extent their legal relations have changed.
Has a contract really been formed? How will the court interpret its provi-
sions? The same is true for a breach of a contract duty. What will the court
decide is an amount that compensates the injured party for the breach?
Ultimately, these questions can only be answered by a court. Accordingly,
as the objection would go, legal relations do not really change until a court
states they have changed, even when the court does so retroactively. In
other words, legal relations are legal concepts that can only be changed by
the agents of the state.
Such an objection would, however, simply be a straw man argument.
It assumes that Hohfeld had a greater purpose than simply seeking to avoid
chain of causation, and loss resulting to him thereafter is suffered through his own act. It is not dam-
age that has been caused by the wrongful act of the employer.") (citations omitted), amending remini-
tur, 171 N.E. 770 (N.Y. 1930)).
432. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-712(3) (2013) ("Failure of the buyer to effect cover ... does not bar him
from any other remedy."); id. official cmt. 3 ("Subsection (3) expresses the policy that cover is not a
mandatory remedy for the buyer.").
433. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981).
434. Id.
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errors in legal reasoning. And for the purpose of avoiding such errors,
Hohfeld's system is unassailable.
V. CONCLUSION
Wesley Hohfeld's theory of legal relations did much more than just
provide the American legal realists with ammunition in their revolt against
legal formalism. Hohfeld's theories provided law students, lawyers, and
judges with the tools to avoid errors in legal reasoning. Hohfeldian analy-
sis epitomizes "thinking like a lawyer." And because no legal system
should tolerate sloppy analysis, it is imperative that Hohfeld's contribu-
tions remain a vital part of our legal system, within contract law and be-
yond it.
